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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT

by

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September 2005

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CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT

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ABSTRACT

Responding and recovering from large scale disasters is extremely labor intensive. Unfortunately, a problem confronting all communities is inability to employ on a regular basis the large number of personnel needed to effectively manage large scale disasters. One possible solution to increase workforce capacity during times of critical need is for emergency managers to integrate a volunteer component into their existing disaster management plan. The federal government is assisting local communities with volunteer recruitment by nationally sponsoring Neighborhood Watch, Volunteers in Police Service, Medical Reserve Corps, Community Emergency Response Team and Fire Corps programs through county-wide Citizen Corps Councils.

The acceptance of volunteers by paid responders can vary significantly from one community to another. The results of a 13 item questionnaire from 50 CERT volunteers from a metropolitan community, who had at least one previous experience working with paid responders during the recovery phase of a large scale disaster identified that 24 percent felt as if they were in the way, 20 percent felt as if they worked harder than the paid responders, 36 percent were given assignments that did not match their skill level or training, only 48 percent were tasked immediately and only 60 percent reported that paid responders were helpful. Encouraging is the fact that even though some experiences may have been less than optimal, 100 percent reported that they would feel comfortable working with the same responders during another event. In addition, two case studies are used to tell the story of CERT volunteers that assisted with the recovery phase after the 2004 hurricane season in Florida. Each case study concludes with a list of lessons learned that emergency managers can consider when planning for similar missions.

Primary issues and courses of action are provided to assist community leaders with deciding whether or not volunteers should be integrated into their existing disaster management plans. If the decision is made to integrate volunteers, several recommendations are discussed to assist planners with developing implementation strategies to address the needs and concerns of both population's volunteers and paid responders.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The extraordinarily large number of personnel needed immediately following and during the initial days after a large scale disaster has required public safety officials to seek out untapped human resources within their communities. Large scale disasters such as Hurricane Andrew that hit Homestead, FL. in August 1992; the terrorist attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma on April 19, 1995; the terrorist attack on New York and Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001; Hurricane Charley that hit Charlotte and Hardee County, FL. on August 13, 2004; Hurricane Frances that hit Palm Beach, FL. on September 4, 2004; Hurricane Ivan that hit Pensacola, FL. on September 15, 2004; and Hurricane Jeanne that hit near Stuart, FL. on September 26, 2004 have taught response and recovery strategists the importance of integrating and coordinating civilian volunteers into disaster management planning.

Unfortunately, anecdotal evidence suggests that a mutual feeling of acceptance and respect is not always shared between both the volunteers and paid responders. Differences in personalities, uncertainty about the future, resistance to change and the inability to know the criminal history of volunteers that spontaneously arrive to provide assistance at large disaster scenes are a few of many factors that may contribute to the problem. However, since volunteers are now recognized as a vital resource that can increase a community's workforce capacity to assist in both local and national homeland security initiatives, it is imperative that emergency management planners reach out to their community's volunteers and learn from their prior operational experiences by collecting and analyzing information obtained through surveys and/or interviews. The results of the feedback can be used to tailor inclusive programs that can meet the specific needs of each community. The data presented in this thesis was collected from members of a Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) that is located in a metropolitan community.

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Paid public safety organizations cannot adequately provide the large number of human resources necessary to safely and efficiently manage the response and recovery operations of large scale disasters without the assistance of volunteers. Fortunately, our American willingness to help each other in times of need has historically resulted in large numbers of citizen volunteers to simultaneously converge onto disaster scenes to assist the paid responders. The problem attributed to this type of benevolence is that the disorderly arrival of large numbers of volunteers immediately following a large scale disaster can have negative consequences, such as preventing entry and egress to and from the disaster area by blocking streets with their vehicles, becoming injured themselves and/or disturbing evidence in a potential crime scene. Other problems associated with volunteer management at disaster scenes include liability, security level clearances and the need to verify the skill level or vocational trade specialty of each volunteer in order to adequately match the volunteer's skill level with an appropriate job assignment.

B. PURPOSE OF THE THESIS

There are several purposes of this thesis. This first is to provide information that decision makers may find helpful regarding volunteer management issues such as the impact of volunteers during disaster response and recovery efforts, the use of federally funded community-based volunteer organizations to empower citizens to become integrated into the nation's homeland security strategy and how proven social strategies can help to develop meaningful partnerships between former autonomous groups such as volunteers with paid responders. A second purpose of the thesis is to collect data from a purposive sample of CERT volunteers, who assisted paid responders after the 2004 hurricane season in Florida, to measure quantitatively their perceptions regarding the treatment they experienced when working with paid responders. The third purpose is to present qualitatively real operational experiences via volunteer interviews and develop a list of lessons learned. The lessons learned from the volunteer interviews will provide emergency managers with a resource supported by past experiences that can be used to

minimize or eliminate the effects of similar problems. The final purpose of the thesis is to present primary issues and courses of action along with several strategic recommendations that community leaders can consider if they decide to develop an implementation plan to integrate volunteers into their existing emergency management plans.

C. SIGNIFICANCE AND BACKGROUND

In order to provide affordable public safety protection, most if not all communities must limit the number of firefighters and police officers that can be regularly employed and staffed to the number of personnel routinely required to handle the regular volume of service-related calls. Due to this common practice of utilizing minimum staffing levels, existing local public safety personnel will be quickly overwhelmed during any type of labor intensive large scale disaster. Since this systemic inadequacy exists throughout every community, it is incumbent upon community leaders and public safety planners to integrate volunteers into their emergency operation plans in order to increase the workforce capacity to supplement the limited paid resources during times of critical need.

It is understood that both intentional and natural disasters can have devastating effects on a community's infrastructure (i.e. roads, communication centers, power grids, etc.), which in turn could limit or eliminate the ability to receive and/or dispatch emergency responders to calls for assistance. As a result, it is therefore critical that emergency response planners solicit the assistance of the many active and retired public health caregivers (nurses and physicians), off-duty fire/rescue and law enforcement officers, certified electricians, licensed construction workers, and so forth that reside within each of our communities to fill in the gaps when traditional emergency response resources cannot be reached and/or arrive at an incident in a timely manner. Coordination and communication are critical elements in order to maintain scene control and security. Both the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building and the World Trade Center attacks educated public safety officials regarding the importance of coordinating citizen involvement prior to an actual incident. In Oklahoma, due to the inability to control

citizen involvement “A volunteer nurse became the 168th fatality when falling debris struck her as she responded to the emergency” (Office for Victims of Crime, 2000, p. 8).

Emergency managers can effectively minimize on-scene confusion and utilize formerly untapped human resources efficiently by developing preplans that effectively integrate community volunteers into disaster management activities. Incident commanders will always have to manage spontaneous arriving volunteers at large scale disasters; however, through effective recruitment programs and inclusive emergency management planning and training, the subsequent distractions caused by spontaneous arriving volunteers can be minimized. For example, the number of potentially spontaneous arriving volunteers that can be identified, trained and planned for prior to a disaster is directly proportionate to the reduction of the number of spontaneous arriving volunteers that could create confusion and scene security complications. Unfortunately, many paid responders view volunteers as an operational inhibitor rather than an operational enhancer (Meyers, 2005). It is therefore critical to educate paid responders regarding the many benefits of volunteers and to develop policies and programs that will create opportunities for volunteers and paid emergency responders to interface with each other in an effective and mutually respected manner prior to a situation at a disaster scene.

D. SUMMARY

Managing large scale disasters will be very labor intensive and require individuals with different sets of technical and professional skills. Communities are unable to regularly employ the large number of human resources that would be required to effectively respond and recover from most large scale disasters. As a result community leaders must solicit and recruit volunteers to fill this gap. A community’s workforce capability during a disaster can be significantly increased using their own existing, community-based volunteer organizations. Emergency planners should review their existing emergency operating procedures and integrate a volunteer component if one does not exist. Policies and programs should be developed and implemented to create an

environment that will allow volunteers and paid responders to build both social and professionals relationships prior to an actual disaster.

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II. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAKERS

The purpose of this chapter is to provide information that community leaders may find helpful regarding volunteer management. The subject matter chosen for review and presentation in this chapter was selected to help decision makers decide whether or not volunteers should be integrated into their disaster management plans. Included in this chapter are the following sections: Citizen Involvement at Large Scale Disasters in America, The Role of Citizens in Homeland Security, The Need for Collaboration in Inclusive Environments and Summary.

A. CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT AT LARGE SCALE DISASTERS IN AMERICA

The recent terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C., draw attention to the important role of non-professional individuals and groups in the immediate and long term response to disasters with mass casualties that cannot be contained within a perimeter of yellow tape

(Glass & Schoch-Spana, 2001, p. 217).

Certain duties such as:

- Assisting with the registration and skill level screening of other volunteers at the Volunteer Reception/Coordination Center
- Entering the names and treatment locations of casualties as they become available into computer databases along with the names and telephone numbers of individuals, who are in search of missing loved ones in order to develop informational databases that can be cross referenced for rapidly re-uniting family members
- Operating heavy demolition machinery
- Relocating construction debris in large commercially operated hauling vehicles
- Assisting to maintain a secure perimeter to keep out the curious bystanders and free up the police for more pertinent activities
- Feeding rescue workers and so forth

are all assignments that can be staffed with volunteers, thus allowing trained rescue worker's efforts to be exclusively committed to searching for victims and saving human life from imminent danger. The down side of this additional workforce capacity is that, if volunteers are not anticipated and planned for, their sudden arrival can become more detrimental than helpful to the mission at hand. This section will discuss several management issues regarding citizen involvement during disasters.

1. Matching Volunteer Skill Levels with Job Assignments

Volunteer management organizations have been a vital element at large scale disasters and have saved thousands of lives through their tireless efforts (Lowe, 2002). Their individual expertise and technical knowledge has enhanced productivity at many emergency scenes. There are many safety considerations regarding task assignments, making it critical to match skilled assignments with skilled workers and semiskilled assignments with semiskilled workers.

For example, in the wake of the 911 attacks, the World Trade Center site required about 10,000 skilled support personnel (heavy equipment operators, truck drivers, iron workers, carpenters, and laborers) per day during the initial search and cleanup period

(Carafano, 2003, p. 2).

When predetermined responsibilities are clearly defined, understood and practiced regularly, less chaos and confusion will occur, thus providing a more seamless approach to safely mitigating all types of emergencies.

2. Size Up

The first arriving responders must be able to quickly and accurately size up the incident. "Size up is the ongoing process of evaluating a situation to determine what has happened, what is happening, what is likely to happen, and what resources will be needed to resolve the situation" (Goodson and Sneed, 1998, p.271). Naturally, it is more difficult to make accurate observations and assessments during size up if excessive numbers of individuals are congesting the disaster site. An important part of size up is to determine

the type and magnitude of the hazards present. Hazards are analyzed to determine the degree of risk involved with various tactical operations. The decision as to how and when to act will be based on an acceptable level of risk to the rescuers, while yielding a high probability of benefit to the victims. The golden rule for emergency responders is to assure, if at all possible, that the number of victims does not increase after the arrival of emergency care providers. It is therefore critical to minimize external distractions and hindrances such as those caused by spontaneously arriving volunteers.

3. Dealing with Convergence

Difficulty securing a disaster scene is largely attributed to convergence. “Convergence is a phenomenon that occurs when people, goods, and services are spontaneously mobilized and sent to a disaster-stricken area” (Carafano, 2003, p. 5). Proactive communities that develop comprehensive emergency response standard operating procedures, and routinely participate in multi-agency table top scenarios and live training exercises to evaluate and improve their capabilities, will greatly reduce the problems associated with convergence. For example, if a mass casualty incident occurred at a preplanned target hazard such as an outdoor sports stadium, convergence could be controlled if all the responding Good Samaritans converged to a pre determined staging site located a short distance away from the actual scene.

4. Scene Security and Control

The inability to initially control egress points to and from large-scale disaster scenes, such as Oklahoma or New York, can be attributed to three factors. The first factor is associated with the many public routes of travel that allow access to and from public areas such as a business district and/or large places of assembly such as sports stadiums. Blocking the streets with emergency equipment without the human resources necessary to prevent the use of sidewalks will not serve as a clear barrier to prevent entry. Volunteers that simultaneously converge to help at large scale disasters often do not equate streets blocked with nonhuman methods such as “do not enter” tape and traffic cones as an entry restriction that pertains to themselves.

The second factor is related to the ability to completely cordon off all entry and exit routes to the scene. Scene control and security is directly proportionate to the number of on-duty law enforcement officers that are available to immediately respond to the scene. As additional resources arrive via mutual aid and re-call to duty public safety personnel, scene security will become more manageable. Unfortunately, the over population of spontaneously arriving volunteers will require resources that are needed for operations such as search and rescue to be used instead to control and enforce citizen evacuations.

The third factor, which to date is only a theory and has been untested, may be the most helpful regarding scene security, and inevitably may be able to self-control the entry of non-essential individuals. This factor is associated with the type of WMD agent that is used in an intentional attack. The writer speculates that incidents involving chemical, biological or radioactive agents will create a deterrent regarding non-essential individuals from rushing into an affected area due to these agent's deadly reputation and their ability to potentially spread and cause cross contamination.

Large scale explosive incidents in both Oklahoma and New York that unstable structures are not enough of a deterrent to keep citizens out of dangerous areas. In Oklahoma, Public Safety officials were initially unable to evacuate non-essential personnel and control the scene. The scene was very chaotic until fears of a secondary device were broadcasted over all first responder's portable radios. After the secondary device warning was broadcasted, the citizens that stayed in the area after the blast and the ones who had rushed in to help, immediately fled in panic in all directions (CNN, 1995). This warning proved to be very beneficial towards scene security and control, in that once everyone self-evacuated the hazardous area, law enforcement officers were finally able to establish a meaningful perimeter.

The same chaos and confusion experienced in Oklahoma again occurred in New York. Again, many citizens rushed into the hazardous area, fighting poor visibility and air quality in an attempt to save lives. The unselfish acts of the citizens were very noble and courageous. Unknowingly, however, these non-skilled volunteers were hurting more than they were helping as they rushed onto rubble piles looking for victims. The added

weight and additional safety hazards that these volunteers created, forced the firefighters to stop searching for their comrades so that they could lock arms and walk as a wave towards the perimeters to remove all nonessential personnel (Coloe, 2004).

5. Volunteer Management

Volunteer organizations are a necessary component throughout the entire life cycle of any incident. As previously mentioned, scene security and control is very hard to establish initially and is best maintained through the use of human resources. Getting the appropriately skilled workers and volunteers into a disaster scene can be a very time consuming process. In New York, “spontaneous volunteers encountered and observed a wide variety of obstacles to helping” (Lowe, 2002, p. 3). This delay can be compounded if the disaster site is also a crime scene, thus requiring law enforcement officers to identify and screen all individuals entering or exiting the area (Lowe, 2002). To put this into perspective, Pfefferbaum (1996) reported that 12,000 individuals responded to the scene in Oklahoma, and Lowe (2002) identified that in New York “by two and one half weeks after the disaster, the Red Cross had received approximately 22,000 offers of assistance and had processed 15,570 volunteers” (p. 2). In addition, the Salvation Army also reported managing a massive volunteer response (Bortree, 2001).

Unfortunately, not all large-scale disasters solicit a large volunteer response from the community thus leaving the limited number of paid human resources overwhelmed. This trend was evident during the recovery phase following the four hurricanes that devastated communities throughout Florida in 2004. Clearly there was a difference between the number of volunteers that responded following the terrorist attack in Oklahoma and New York compared to the natural disasters suffered in Florida. For this reason it is imperative that local emergency management planners understand the importance of volunteer recruitment and implement proven strategies associated with volunteer coordination and retention.

B. THE ROLE OF CITIZENS IN HOMELAND SECURITY

There are many roles that citizens can perform to serve their country and assist their community in securing our homeland. “It’s vital that all states realize the value and importance of one common asset – their citizens” (Bingham, 2004, p. 17). After all, “It’s the citizens who create the environment that is hard for terrorists to operate in” (Evans, 2005, p. 27). Communities can greatly improve their prevention capabilities by utilizing citizens to increase the eyes and ears that are on the lookout for suspicious behavior and activities. Effective partnerships between law enforcement and citizens have a proven track record. For example, “Take a look at TV shows like ‘America’s Most Wanted.’ You see local police at work with citizens. We’ve been doing it for years” (Evans, 2005, p. 28). Communities struggling with limited money and manpower will be able to increase their capabilities by integrating citizens into local homeland security strategy.

“Preparing for acts of mass violence has become an important priority for Federal, State, and local officials” (Office for Victims of Crime, 2000). These leaders agree that to effectively create a secure and safer homeland, communities must take ownership and engage in training, preparedness, and citizen involvement (Carafano, 2003; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004; Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2004; Maningas, Robinson, & Mallone, 1997; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1998; Pfefferbaum, 1996; Turman, 2000). “Citizen involvement can help create self-sustainability. The participation of citizens provides an ongoing basis of enthusiasm, ideas, and labor” (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1998).

During the 2002 Ohio State University commencement ceremony, President George W. Bush proclaimed,

I have asked all Americans to commit at least two years-4,000 hours over a lifetime-to the service of our neighbors and our nation. My administration created what we call the USA Freedom Corps to help Americans find service opportunities at home and abroad. We’re doubling the size of the Peace Corps. We’ll increase Americorps by 50 percent. We’ve created Citizen Corps to help protect the homeland

(Bingham, 2004).

To address the funding required for such a wide spread program, in 2003 President Bush allocated four billion dollars in grant money for the nations first responders, and \$40 million, targeted for Citizen Corps Councils (City of Roseville, CA). Homeland security funding is provided as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimizing the damage and recover from attacks that do occur” (Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. 2).

Citizen Corps is the component of USA Freedom Corps that creates opportunities for individuals to volunteer to help their communities prepare for and respond to emergencies by bridging together local leaders, citizen volunteers and the network of first responder organizations, such as fire departments, police departments and emergency medical personnel

(Citizen Corps, p. 4).

The complacency associated with the belief that “it” will never happen to me, or to my community, is now viewed as the exception rather than the norm. Through Citizen Corps Councils, communities across America are uniting and adopting the philosophy that “individual survival is contingent upon the survival and well-being of society” (Marriam & Cunningham, 1989, p. 54). As of February 2005 there are 1,554 community based Citizen Corps Councils, which serve 64 percent of the total United States population (Citizen Corps, 2005).

What all Citizen Corps Councils will have in common is that our local leaders will be working to expand opportunities for their community members to engage in volunteer service that will support emergency preparation, prevention, and response

(Bush, 2002).

The mission of Citizen Corps is to harness the power of every individual through **education, training, and volunteer service** to make communities safer, stronger, and better prepared to respond to the threats of terrorism, crime, public health issues, and disasters of all kinds

(City of Roseville, CA., p.1).

Many communities benefit from having volunteer service groups that provide social services in times of need. For the most part, each of these groups has traditionally

operated autonomously in respect to their individual missions and organization structure. Citizen Corps Councils can be used by communities to bridge these autonomous groups together into a unified system which incorporates Homeland Security initiatives into their individual missions. “The basic premise of these interagency relationships is the acknowledgment that working together is likely to produce better outcomes than acting alone” (Melaville & Blank, 1991, p. 85). It is imperative that community leaders openly support Citizen Corps Councils and promote the development of action plans that can weave together the common threads of each volunteer group, private sector trade, and Public Safety agency into a seamless structure capable of being deployed instantaneously to all types of disasters.

The Citizen Corps publication, *A Guide for Local Officials: Executive Summary*, cites five nationally sponsored programs that are a subcomponent of Citizen Corps. The programs include:

1. Neighborhood Watch

The Neighborhood Watch program, which is funded by the DOJ [Department of Justice] and administered by the National Sheriffs’ Association, has been reinvigorated to increase the number of groups involved in crime prevention, homeland security and preparedness efforts. Neighborhood Watch members can contribute to homeland security by:

- Being the “eyes” and “ears” of law enforcement and report suspicious behavior and activity to authorities
- Protecting one’s self and family during emergencies
- Protecting and comforting neighborhood children during emergencies
- Create databases to identify neighborhood seniors that may be home alone during emergency situations

2. Community Emergency Response Team

FEMA's Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) program provides training in emergency preparedness and in basic response techniques to local instructors who in turn train citizens, enabling them to take a more active role in personal and public safety. CERT members can contribute to homeland security by:

- Being trained in first aid and basic emergency response skills
- Protecting one's self, neighborhood and workplace during emergencies if First Responders are delayed or overwhelmed
- Participating in mass casualty training exercises
- Staffing evacuation shelters during natural disasters
- Organizing themselves and other spontaneous arriving volunteers to be effective at disaster scenes

3. Volunteers in Police Service

Volunteer in Police Service (VIPS) is funded by DOJ and administered by the International Association of Chiefs of Police. The program provides training for volunteers to perform administrative and non-intervention policing activities which effectively free up law enforcement professionals for frontline duty. VIPS members can contribute to homeland security by:

- Performing administrative and non-intervention policing activities
- Serving as interpreters
- Assisting with traffic control
- Transporting and repairing department vehicles
- Participating in mass casualty training exercises

4. Medical Reserve Corps

Health and Human Services (HHS) administers a community-based Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) program. Through this program, currently practicing and retired

volunteers trained in healthcare and others interested in public health issues can serve. MRC members can contribute to homeland security by:

- Providing biohazard training for First Responders
- Serving as mental health counselors during and after disasters
- Responding to the scene of large disasters to set up and staff field based treatment centers
- Staffing evacuation shelters during natural disasters
- Providing a reserve of health care professionals at the community level to respond to various health care needs such as influenza outbreaks

5. Are You Ready Campaign

FEMA's Are You Ready Campaign: A Guide to Citizen Preparedness provides practical information on how your family can prepare for any disaster. Additional information pertaining to specific disasters by region (i.e. hurricanes, tornados, flooding, freezing climates, etc. can be obtained on the website, www.citizencorps.gov [September 2, 2005]. This program empowers citizens to contribute to homeland security by:

- Being trained and prepared to take care of their family's basic needs after a disaster in order to allow First Responders to focus on individuals with the most critical needs

6. Fire Corps

On May 6, 2004 a sixth program, Fire Corps was added to the national list. Fire Corps "will provide individuals with opportunities to support their local fire departments by volunteering their time and talent to assist with activities not related directly to fire suppression" (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004). "The successful Volunteers in Police Service (VIPS) program serves as the model for Fire Corps" (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2004).

C. THE NEED FOR COLLABORATION IN INCLUSIVE ENVIRONMENTS

“Partnerships are also a key part of the strategy for homeland security” (Almond, 2004, p. 2). To be successful at integration and developing partnerships, community leaders must be skilled in successful inclusion and collaboration practices. Because inclusion can be interpreted differently, the writer is providing this definition so that all participants and/or stakeholders will start with a common philosophy, thus allowing them to focus on implementation strategies in a more streamlined fashion. Inclusive environments are those in which everyone belongs, is accepted, supports, and is supported by other members of the group. “The development of a partnership is a process, and not a single event” (Epstein, 1995). Cooperative relationships usually develop incrementally. Demonstrating mutual respect will be the key to maintaining long lasting, productive relationships.

Several key factors appear to play a significant role in whether or not inclusion will be successful. All factors are highly correlated with the perceived need for collaboration among the parties involved. For a partnership to be successful, a team approach is necessary. Employing a team approach provides a way to involve more people in the change and problem solving process.

Hobbs and Westling (1998) found that when professionals addressed problems together, they identified more problems, more antecedents or ‘causes’, more objectives, and more intervention plans than when they worked individually

(Hobbs & Westling, 1998, p. 2).

People demonstrate a tendency to buy in and feel empowered when they are truly involved and respected. Involvement also makes people feel that they are important contributing members.

Collaborative consultation involves planning and problem-solving in a highly interactive environment, enabling individuals with diverse expertise to identify and solve problems (Friend & Cook, 1996; Thomas, Korinek, McLaughlin, & Williams, 2000; West & Idol, 1990). A team structure helps to build a consensus for change and can provide quality time to create a new “shared” vision among collaborators. When teams

get the proper amount and type of support to effectively work together, they can build a foundation for strategic planning and program implementation. One of the most critical components in successful collaboration is regularly scheduled time for partners to meet, share information, and monitor progress. The unique skills and information that each team member brings to the planning process helps to ensure that the goals and objectives will be met in an appropriate, timely and successful manner. Organized teams can work more effectively with community leaders and compete for collaborative grants by successfully meeting requirements together.

Collaboration is a style of direct interaction between individuals. Effective collaboration is an ongoing participation process involving two or more individuals who are committed to working together to achieve common goals. Collaborative relationships should be voluntary. Voluntary participation helps to ensure each member's commitment to the process. There must be mutual respect for each participant's unique skills, perspectives and knowledge. No one person is more valuable than another and everyone's contribution is of equal importance. Collaborative relationships emerge out of shared concerns of like-minded individuals.

Adams & Cessna (1991); Cramer (1998); Pugach & Johnson (1995) reported that shared leadership encourages greater participation, stronger commitment, ongoing support, more creative problem solving and better program monitoring and improvement

(Thomas, Korinek, McLaughlin, & Williams, 2000, p. 118).

Communication is an important element for successful collaborative environments. Language translators to assist in participation may be required (Epstein, 1995). Effective communication skills allow individuals to recognize and address barriers that interfere with the sharing of individual needs, interests and perspectives with the achievement of compromise and consensus. When impasses occur, conflict management strategies should be used to reduce down time. Coombs (1987) identified three types of conflict that may be encountered during collaboration. The first type occurs when the participants must choose an outcome when their individual goals are incompatible. The second occurs when the participants want different outcomes but must settle on one. And the third occurs when the participants each want the same thing but

only one can have it. Thomas, Korinek, McLaughlin, and Williams (2000) discussed several common conflict management strategies. These strategies include:

- Avoiding or withdrawing from the conflict physically
- Dominating or forcing others to accept a solution to the conflict
- Obliging by giving up something in exchange for something from the other party
- Compromising and working through conflicts by seeking solutions that achieve both their goals and the goals of the other party in the conflict

D. SUMMARY

This chapter provided a several considerations that community leaders should consider when planning a strategy to implement local volunteers into their disaster management plans. History has taught us that there is a high probability that American citizens will immediately converge onto large scale disaster scenes. Naturally, knowing this information prior to an incident will prevent emergency planners from being caught off guard by allowing them the ability to anticipate, prepare for and manage spontaneous arriving volunteers. As a way to integrate citizens into the overall emergency preparedness strategy, President Bush has called for each citizen to volunteer for 4,000 hours over a lifetime. To provide easy access to community based volunteer organizations, Citizen Corps was developed and nationally implemented. Citizen Corps is the mechanism that is being used to inform local citizens of the volunteer opportunities that are available in their communities. The program is also designed to integrate the formerly local autonomous NW, VIPS, CERT and MRC volunteer organizations into a cohesive entity that can be used to supplement paid responders under one county-wide organizational structure. Finally, the chapter outlined successful collaboration practices that may assist with developing effective partnerships.

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III. METHODOLOGY

The previous chapters support the need to nationally integrate volunteers into disaster management planning. This concept is certainly easier said than done. What makes a national implementation plan difficult for this type of program is that each community has its own personality, so to speak, as it relates to paid responders willingness to readily accept help from volunteers. For example, rural communities have traditionally relied on volunteers to assist with public safety functions such as firefighting and would probably experience more positive working relations between volunteers and paid responders than those observed in urban environments. This statement is pure speculation and should not be left to such a subjective statement. Community leaders should use information collection methods to gather objective data that can be used to accurately measure the degree of friction, if any, and possible root causes so that effective policies and programs can be developed and implemented. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss how the research used for this thesis was carried out to explore a group of CERT volunteers' perceived acceptance and working relationships with paid responders. Included in this chapter are the following sections: Research Design, Population and Sample, Data Collection Instruments, Data Collection Procedures, and Data Analysis.

A. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis examined data that was collected from members of a metropolitan CERT. There were two research methods used to collect data. The first method used a qualitative approach to collect information through interviews with several CERT members. The interviews were used to present several case studies associated with the deployment procedures and operational experiences of the volunteers during the recovery phase of the 2004 hurricane season. The second method used a non-experimental design, which collected quantitative data to examine volunteer's perceptions regarding their acceptance by and working relationships with paid responders.

B. POPULATION AND SAMPLE

The population for this research consisted of community service volunteers in a large metropolitan community. Participants were selected from a CERT that assisted with the recovery phase following the four hurricanes that made landfall in the state of Florida during the 2004 hurricane season. As of April 2005, the CERT used for this research consists of approximately 150 members. Of those, approximately 55 members participated in the recovery efforts during the 2004 hurricane season. Of those 55 volunteers 50 participated in this research. These CERT members were assigned to various missions, which provided the opportunity to work alongside with paid First Responders. Six of the 55 CERT members were recruited by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and deployed for at least 30 days throughout the state of Florida. The writer was able to contact four of these CERT members regarding their experiences during their deployment. These members consented to an interview with the researcher. In addition, the CERT coordinator also consented to an interview for the purpose of this thesis. The feedback gathered through the interviews is presented through several case studies. A list of lessons learned as reported by the volunteers that were interviewed is provided after each case study. The remaining CERT members, who have not previously worked with paid responders, were excluded from this research.

C. DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

Two instruments were used to collect data for this study. One instrument was a self-reported demographic survey (see Appendix A for a copy of the demographic survey). This instrument was used to verify that each volunteer participant had at least one prior experience of working with paid responders. Participants that had not previously worked with paid responders were identified through the demographic survey and excluded from the data analysis. Factors affecting the generalizability of the results in this study can be attributed to the various differences between rural, urban and suburban communities regarding the acceptance levels of volunteers by paid responders.

The other instrument was a 13-item questionnaire (see Appendix B for a copy of the volunteer questionnaire), which was used to collect data to measure the degree to which the volunteers perceived friction with paid responders. A search for an existing survey to adequately assess the problem was conducted. Currently there is no existing measurement tool that can be located, so the researcher collaborated with paid First Responders and active community volunteers in order to develop the 13-item questionnaire that was used to collect data.

D. DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES

All participants were explained the scope and purpose of the research and the conditions of participation, which included the completion of a demographic survey and a volunteer questionnaire. The researcher explained that no names would be attached to the data collection instruments and that each participant's confidentiality will be maintained. After the participant verbally agreed to participate, the survey and questionnaire were provided. Completed and returned surveys and questionnaires were filled out and collected by the CERT Coordinator and not in the presence of the researcher. This was discussed so the participants would feel comfortable with providing honest responses to all items on the questionnaire. This method reinforced the confidentiality of each participant. The demographic survey and questionnaire were stapled together to make sure that only data from volunteers that had previously worked with paid responders were used in the data analysis. All participants completed all items on the demographic survey and 13-item questionnaire.

E. DATA ANALYSIS

Descriptive statistics were used to compute frequencies and percentages of the volunteer's responses on the questionnaire to determine the degree of their perceived acceptance and working relationships between them and paid responders. A table is used in Chapter five to display the frequencies and percentages for the data output.

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IV. CASE STUDY

Two case studies involving the use of volunteers during the recovery phases after several hurricanes devastated Florida, along with the lessons learned from these case studies will be presented in this section. The Atlantic hurricane season extends from June 1st through November 30th of each calendar year. The 2004 hurricane season was the most destructive season in Florida's history. Within 44 days four hurricanes made landfall on the state of Florida. "It has been more than 100 years since any state was hit by four hurricanes in one season. The last time was in Texas in 1886" (St. Petersburg times, 2004, p. 1B). The statistics of these four storms include:

- Hurricane Charley made landfall on August 13, 2004 with maximum sustained winds at 145 mph, and resulted in 33 deaths 6.8 billion dollars in damage and 2.7 million people requiring evacuation.
- Hurricane Frances made landfall on September 4, 2004 with maximum sustained winds at 105 mph, and resulted in 38 deaths 4.1 billion dollars in damage and 1.8 million people requiring evacuation.
- Hurricane Ivan made landfall on September 15, 2004 with maximum sustained winds at 135 mph, and resulted in 29 deaths 3.8 billion dollars in damage and 545,000 people requiring evacuation.
- Hurricane Jeanne made landfall on September 26, 2004 with maximum sustained winds at 115 mph, and resulted in 17 deaths 2.8 billion dollars in damage with 4.4 million people requiring evacuation.

Collectively these four storms had a devastating effect on several Florida communities. The Coordinator of the Greater Tampa Community Emergency Response Team (GT-CERT) is Bonnie Goodwin. The two case studies presented in this section were made possible as a result of Mrs. Goodwin's documentation of events as they occurred and her willingness to provide feedback of her experiences with the author in an attempt to create a list of lessons learned that could be shared with others so that best practices could be developed. Another case study was made possible through interviews from other CERT members that were recruited and employed part time by FEMA to assist with recovery efforts throughout the state. With the exception of Mrs. Goodwin,

who consented to being identified in these case studies, the other CERT members will remain anonymous and identified as CERT participant one through four. In addition, other part time FEMA employees that were interviewed will also remain anonymous and be identified as FEMA representative one through three. Name and title is used to identify full time employed individuals of an emergency service agency.

A. CASE STUDY: CERT VOLUNTEERS RESPOND AFTER HURRICANE CHARLEY

On Sunday, August 15, 2004 just over one full day after Hurricane Charley made landfall, Mrs. Goodwin assembled 33 City of Tampa CERT team members and responded to Hardee County following a request for mutual aid from the EOC. Upon arrival, the CERT team met with Director Bill Muhlfeld at the Hardee County Emergency Operation Center (EOC). It was apparent to Mrs. Goodwin that the EOC staff was overwhelmed with their recovery efforts. On their first day there they were basically the only volunteers to offer assistance with the exception of several local volunteers. As a result Director Muhlfeld welcomed the CERT team with open arms and invited the team inside the EOC. The EOC staff immediately tasked the group with distributing information flyers throughout the local community. The CERT team set up a grid system and sent out teams, using the buddy system to local neighborhoods around the EOC. The CERT teams reassembled back at the EOC at 11:30 a.m. and several groups were sent back out to different locations.

A group of eight CERT team members stayed behind on the second outing and made sandwiches for the shelter and for the community distribution center. Another group of CERT team members were sent to a local Kash n' Karry store to assist in the distribution of ice and water. The Kash n' Karry parking lot was being used as the community's food distribution center. The CERT team at the Kash n' Karry assisted in directing traffic at the distribution center and with maintaining order and security at the food distribution lines. To assist with maintaining order, residents arriving at the food distribution center were instructed to stay in their vehicles and line up according to their time of arrival at the site. This procedure was changed in the following days after due to

the shortage of gasoline and after several cars ran out of gas in line. Around mid-afternoon, a second group was sent to the Farmer's Market to help unload trucks. Each group had a team leader that maintained a list of all members, their work site locations and their assigned duties to keep track of all 33 CERT team members throughout the day.

On Monday August 16th the 33 City of Tampa CERT team members, along with a few Hillsborough County CERT team members and a few local volunteers were again the only non-paid volunteers to go to Hardee County to assist in the recovery efforts. On the third day after the storm other groups (National Guard and Florida Department of Law Enforcement, FDLE) had started to arrive to assist Hardee County. All of a sudden, the CERT team was no longer allowed inside the EOC any more and was directed to go to the food distribution center. At first, the CERT team was also turned away by the National Guard at the food distribution center, but when the CERT team members just stepped in to help where they saw a need, the National Guard personnel realized that the group was there to work hard and subsequently the National Guard personnel worked together with the CERT team members.

On Tuesday August 17th, five CERT team members returned to Hardee County. The EOC sent the group back to the Kash n' Karry to assist in the distribution of water, ice and food. By now there was a tent constructed that was being used as the food distribution center. The CERT team remained at the distribution center the entire day. On Wednesday, August 18th five CERT team members went back to Hardee County. Again the group ran the food tent at the Kash n' Karry food distribution center. Two CERT team members also assisted an elderly woman move out of her house that had been damaged by the storm. On Thursday August 19th a CERT member conducted a donation drive in her neighborhood of Temple Terrace and brought two pick-up trucks full of supplies and clothing to Hardee County on Sunday August 22nd.

On Saturday August 21st sixteen CERT team members returned to Hardee County. By now the EOC had other volunteers assisting at the food distribution center so the CERT team was divided into two groups. The smaller group was used to go door to door in the more rural areas of the county to pass out informational flyers, while the other group assisted with debris removal in suburban neighborhoods. The group that went to

the rural area to pass out flyers was not successful, due to the fact that they did not know the area and drove many miles in areas that were only populated with orange groves. The group that participated with debris removal was very busy throughout the entire day. On Sunday August 22nd seven CERT team members returned to Hardee County. One was a certified electrician who assisted with electrical work while the others participated in debris removal. Overall, the City of Tampa CERT team had 39 members go to Hardee County along with 10 friends.

Mrs. Goodwin related that overall the CERT team experiences during the recovery efforts after Hurricane Charley was not that bad. In all, the CERT team worked together with the FDLE, the National Guard, some prisoners and several church groups. Mrs. Goodwin related that even though there was resistance by the National Guard to work with the CERT team at first, eventually everyone worked together towards a common goal. She added that there were some negative attitudes to deal with and that she had one run in with someone from the EOC, but otherwise, everything went smoothly. The worst experience occurred on the second weekend when the CERT team was sent away by the EOC staff and told to go home. This situation was very frustrating and discouraging to the CERT team members given the fact that they had driven two hours to get to Hardee County and had been there from the start of the disaster working hard when no other assistance was available to the community. The CERT members just went out on their own and stopped at a home to assist a church group who was removing debris and in need of assistance. A few non-CERT volunteers that went with the CERT members just went home.

On December 9th the writer called the Hardee County EOC in an attempt to receive feedback from Director Muhlfeld and learned that Mr. Muhlfeld is no longer the Director of Hardee County's EOC and that Fire Chief Choate is currently serving as the Acting Director. Chief Choate related that he worked with the Tampa CERT team and asked me to pass on to the CERT team his deepest gratitude for their assistance during his county's greatest time of need. Chief Choate stated that it is difficult for him to express how moved he was emotionally when our CERT team arrived, because they along with only a handful of other volunteers were the only ones to arrive immediately following the

storm. He explained that everyone and everything went to Charlotte County after the media dubbed that location ground zero, when in fact Charlotte County only had 30% of their community affected while Hardee County was 100% affected. He related that 100% of Hardee County had no power and no ability to flush toilets for 11 days and that 100% of his community needed ice, water and food. Chief Choate then added that his community was without any form of communications for nearly 72 hours after the storm, and what impressed him the most was the fact our CERT team arrived with six licensed Ham radio operators and six portable Ham radios. These operators provided to be the vital link between the County's EOC, the police, the firefighters and the food distribution center. He cited that the CERT teams ability to restore communications during that critical time was so important that he would rate their accomplishments on that mission a seven and possibly even higher on a scale of 1 to 10.

1. Lessons Learned

The lessons learned as a result of the feedback that was provided by the deployment participants include:

- The need to have a system for taking breaks. This lesson was learned after the first day of deployment as a result of several CERT team members becoming overheated by the middle of the day. Being the only volunteers that arrived to help, coupled with so many people needing assistance, created an atmosphere in which no one wanted to take a break, not even for a minute. As a result, several CERT team members were visibly fatigued and forced by other members to take short breaks towards the end of the day.
- The need to bring a supply of sunscreen and bug spray, since all of their recovery efforts involved performing tasks out doors.
- The need for a Recreational Vehicle (RV) to provide shade and air conditioning for breaks and rehabilitation for all human resources.
- The need for a Recreational Vehicle (RV) or other form of portable restroom with a sink to periodically wash up and use a hand sanitizer.
- The need to develop a strategy that will not require victims to line up by remaining in their vehicles at the food distribution center. Maintaining victims in their vehicles assisted with coordination, control and order;

however, the inability to refuel vehicles due to the shortage of gasoline in and around Hardee County increased the cost of this decision well above the benefits that were gained.

- The need to develop community-wide databases that can be used to identify volunteers who possess special talents. For example, during the CERT teams activation to Hardee County one of the volunteers recognized how her ham radio experience could greatly assist with the EOC's inability to communicate with workers in the field. As a result, the CERT team was able to provide several licensed ham radio operators and portable radios, which were instrumental in opening the line of communications between the EOC and workers operating in the field. These ham radio enthusiasts proved to be a vital link between the County's EOC, the police, the firefighters and the food distribution center.

B. CASE STUDY: FEMA/SERT CALLS FOR ASSISTANCE

Between August 13 and September 25, 2004 four Hurricanes (Charley, Frances, Ivan and Jeanne) devastated several communities throughout the State of Florida. Especially rare, in addition to four hurricanes impacting the same state was the large size of the storms. As a result of these natural disasters, FEMA sent out a call to Florida's entire County's Emergency Operation Centers (EOC) in search of CERT Team members that could be temporarily employed to assist with their recovery field operations. This case study will be presented in two parts. The first part will discuss the events leading up to the actual deployment of participants as reported by Mrs. Goodwin and the second part will discuss the events that occurred during the deployment as reported by the CERT team participants that were deployed.

1. Part One: The Call for Volunteers

On September 6, 2004 Tom Weaver, the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) Coordinator, sent out a request for all CERT volunteers to respond to their local chapter coordinator if they were interested in assisting the state and FEMA's recovery efforts (see Appendix C for a copy of the request). This letter explained that participants "need to be able to spend a minimum of 5+ days and preferably up to 14 days on scene." On September 7th Mr. Weaver sent out a revised call for volunteers with information

detailing the potential for volunteers facing rough conditions while working long hours (see Appendix D for a copy of the request). This letter explained that the volunteers “must be physically able to work in a disaster area without refrigeration for medications and have the ability to work in the outdoors all day.” The second letter reconfirmed that the “activation periods will be for several days, possibly up to two weeks.”

On September 8th Linda Mandell, the Contracts Manager with the Hillsborough County Planning & Growth Management Department, received information from the state that once Hillsborough County had recruited between 15-25 individuals that were interested in volunteering, a FEMA trainer would be sent to their location. Mrs. Mandell was informed that the volunteers would be deployed between September 11th and the 13th, and that the volunteers could be recruited as full time or part time. On September 9th Mrs. Mandell received the FEMA hiring packets and a letter outlining the deployment instructions for volunteers from Mr. Weaver (see Appendix E for a copy of Mr. Weaver’s letter).

On September 13th after several calls to the State Emergency Management office, the GT-CERT Coordinator, Bonnie Goodwin spoke with Ted Keith from the State Emergency Management office. Mr. Keith related that they were ready to set up training and that everyone must attend the training session. He stated that all the Tampa CERT participants would be staying in Hillsborough County at this time since that county had been declared a disaster area. Mr. Keith thanked Mrs. Goodwin for getting all of the City of Tampa CERT Team participant’s forms to him so quickly.

On September 15th Mrs. Goodwin spoke with an individual that will be referred to as FEMA representative # 1. FEMA representative # 1 identified himself as a CERT member from out of state representing FEMA and that he was directed to provide training for the Tampa CERT team. FEMA representative # 1 informed Mrs. Goodwin that the training had to be held that night from 6-8 p.m. at the Hillsborough County EOC. It was related that this opportunity would be their only chance for training. FEMA representative # 1 related that he had been sent to Pasco County initially and now was being redirected to Hillsborough County, because the Pasco County EOC did not want his assistance or their CERT team trained. FEMA representative # 1 informed Mrs.

Goodwin that initially he was not allowed to train her team, but on his last day of deployment he was told to provide them with the training. FEMA representative # 1 related that he and his wife had been flown first to Atlanta and then to Tampa, where they received a rental car and stayed in a hotel for two weeks. It was the impression of Mrs. Goodwin that FEMA representative # 1 did not get much accomplished during his stay.

After several calls Mrs. Goodwin spoke with Mr. Keith on September 20th. Mr. Keith related that he was going to put Mrs. Goodwin in touch with Sonya Murray, who is the State Community Relations Coordinator. Mr. Keith informed Mrs. Goodwin that if there was not enough work in Hillsborough County, the CERT team participants might be allowed to go to surrounding counties. Mr. Keith informed Mrs. Goodwin that if the participants were sent to other counties, they would be hooked up with two FEMA representatives and that they would be traveling to their assigned destinations in FEMA vehicles. Mr. Keith related that the participants would have to make arrangements with the local FEMA representatives to meet them each morning. Mr. Keith related that those who can be committed for 5-14 days would be deployed first and those that have limited availability would be used to relieve those members that needed a break. Mr. Keith related that the participants would need to be available for 10-12 hours each day for seven days per week. Mr. Keith related that another CERT member would relieve the participants when a day off was necessary due to the need of a break or to satisfy a prior commitment. Mr. Keith related that the participants may be deployed as early as tomorrow (September 21st), but that would depend on how much work there was in the Hillsborough County area and how quickly they can find a spot for them. Mr. Keith related that FEMA had not deployed the Pinellas County CERT team participants because their county had very little damage.

On September 23rd an individual that will be referred to as FEMA representative # 2 contacted Mrs. Goodwin and related that she had been sent to train the City of Tampa CERT Team. Mrs. Goodwin informed FEMA representative # 2 that FEMA representative # 1 had already trained the Tampa CERT team on September 15th and that the team was still waiting for their deployment orders. FEMA representative # 2 related that she was a CERT member herself from St. Louis and that she had been sitting in

Atlanta for over a week in a hotel suite. FEMA representative # 2 related that she was then sent on a bus to Orlando where she stayed in another hotel before being sent to Lakeland. FEMA representative # 2 related that shortly after arriving in Lakeland she was told that she needed to get out of the way of another storm that was approaching the area, so she was sent to Sarasota for further orders. FEMA representative # 2 related that the agency was not sending her to the Panhandle, because the conditions are reported to be too dangerous there. FEMA representative # 2 related that she had a rental car but had not been given a credit card yet and was spending her own money on expenses. Mrs. Goodwin related that it appeared that FEMA representative # 2 sounded like the whole ordeal had been a very frustrating experience for her.

On September 29th Mrs. Goodwin related that she tracked down Sonya Murray, the State Community Relations Coordinator after a number of frustrating phone calls. Mrs. Murray informed Mrs. Goodwin that only three of the Tampa CERT team participant's applications had been approved so far. Mrs. Murray related that Hillsborough County had been put on a status referred to as maintenance, so she is trying to get orders to ship the Hillsborough County participants to another County.

Also on September 29th Mrs. Goodwin spoke with an individual that will be referred to as FEMA representative # 3. FEMA representative # 3 related that all the Tampa CERT team participants had been approved for deployment; however, they were being required to go out of the county. FEMA representative # 3 related that the assignment would require the participants to be deployed to the East Coast for two weeks. FEMA representative # 3 related that the group would be provided with a vehicle and a hotel room. FEMA representative # 3 related that Mrs. Goodwin would receive a call back on the exact deployment date within 2 to 3 days.

On October 2nd Mrs. Goodwin received a call from Nancy Whitman from the State Emergency Management office in Orlando informing her that the Tampa CERT team participants would be deployed the following Monday morning (October 4th) for a two week assignment to a neighboring county. Mrs. Goodwin asked if there was any flexibility for individuals that had a prior commitment and could not stay for the entire two weeks and was informed by Mrs. Whitman that there would be scheduling flexibility.

Mrs. Goodwin related that within one hour, while she was still calling the 18 CERT team members that volunteered to participate, FEMA representative # 3 called her back and related that the assignment was a mandatory 30-day deployment and that there was no flexibility. Mrs. Goodwin informed FEMA representative # 3 that Mrs. Whitman had related that there would be flexibility regarding deployment lengths, and FEMA representative # 3 sharply stated to Mrs. Goodwin that she needed to let go of her control and that she was not in charge of this operation. FEMA representative # 3 then related to Mrs. Goodwin that she would receive a telephone call on Sunday morning (October 3rd) informing her where to pick up rental cars and where to report in Orlando for additional training on Monday morning (October 4th).

Mrs. Goodwin related that the change in the mandatory length of deployment time reduced the number of participants from 18 to six that could still go. Mrs. Goodwin related that she did not receive the aforementioned telephone call on Sunday (October 3rd) or Monday (October 4th). Mrs. Goodwin related that the participants had been packed and were ready to be deployed, but did not receive a call until Wednesday (October 6th). Mrs. Goodwin related that FEMA representative # 3 finally called her on Wednesday (October 6th) and related that she had been informed that FEMA did not have their credit cards approved or fingerprints checked so they could not be deployed. However, FEMA representative # 3 related that the agency was working on it and that the processing should not take long. Mrs. Goodwin related that the Tampa CERT team participants eventually were deployed a week later (October 13th).

Mrs. Goodwin reported that one of the participants that had been deployed related that they were expecting a much longer deployment than the original 30 days. Mrs. Goodwin also related that one of the CERT team volunteers, who was able to be deployed for the 30 days, had been approved as a FEMA Disaster Assistant Employee, but the individual had not been chosen for deployment. Mrs. Goodwin related that when she informed FEMA representative # 3 of the willing participant she was told that FEMA was very frustrated that the 18 volunteers that had originally agreed to participate couldn't go for thirty days. FEMA representative # 3 then related that she would look into the disposition regarding the volunteer that had been approved and had not been

contacted and would get him involved. As of November 20th the volunteer has gotten nowhere with FEMA. In the meantime, many of the CERT team participants that could not participate after the decision regarding a mandatory 30 day deployment, including the one who had been approved as a FEMA Disaster Assistant Employee but had not been approved for deployment have received credit cards and passwords for their federal benefits.

On December 7th the writer contacted FEMA representative # 3 and made an attempt to talk to her regarding any feedback that she may be able to provide as a way of helping with the development of a list of lessons learned so that a best practices guideline could be drafted for use during future deployments. FEMA representative # 3 first related that she believes that the process needs to be streamlined and that there was an overall lack of training. When I asked for her to expound on her assessment she became very defensive and stated that she was told not to discuss the recovery efforts with non FEMA employees and that I did not have a right to the information because I was not involved with this mission. FEMA representative # 3 then related that she had submitted a report outlining her assessment to her supervisor. I then asked for her supervisor's name and FEMA representative # 3 related that he was not there anymore. After several requests from the writer, FEMA representative # 3 eventually identified the name of the supervisor that she had sent her report to.

2. Lessons Learned by State and Federal Agencies

The lessons learned as a result of the feedback that was provided by the CERT coordinator will be presented in two parts. Part one relates to the lessons that should be learned by the state and federal agencies that are trying to recruit volunteers. These lessons include:

- The need for better communication between state and federal agencies and the local volunteer organizations that they are recruiting for assistance. This need is most specific to the need to disseminate accurate information the first time out.
- The need to follow through when timelines are given.

- The need to expedite the hiring process. The fact that it took an entire month between the call for assistance and the actual deployment of the recruited volunteers was very frustrating for everyone, especially the original 18 members that wanted to be deployed prior to the mandatory 30 day deployment change. The fact that everyone was well aware of the devastation that our neighboring communities suffered and the need for assistance that they were lacking added to the frustration.
- The need to adequately identify reserve resources so that state and federal agencies can quickly process all the applications including the required employment background security checks prior to releasing a state-wide call for assistance.

3. Lessons Learned by Volunteer Coordinators

Part two relates to the lessons that should be learned by the volunteer organization coordinators that are being solicited by state and federal agencies after a disaster. These lessons include:

- The need to educate and forewarn volunteers from the beginning, as well as periodically throughout the recruitment process, that the requirements being disseminated by the state and federal agencies may not always be 100% accurate and are most likely subject to change.
- The need for volunteer coordinators to explain to their members that large-scale recovery efforts could be very difficult to manage in the early stages.
- The need to make volunteers aware that good intent does not always transfer into good implementation. Mrs. Goodwin related that it was very frustrating for her as the local coordinator as well as for the CERT members that wanted to volunteer and participate in the recovery efforts to continuously be told one thing only to have it changed over and over.
- For example, the initial written response from Mr. Weaver the State of Florida CERT Coordinator on September 6th explained that participants “need to be able to spend a minimum of 5+ days and preferably up to 14 days on scene.” Mr. Weaver’s revised call for volunteers on September 7th stated that the “Activation periods will be for several days, possibly up to two weeks”. On September 20th Mr. Keith from the State Emergency Management office related to Mrs. Goodwin that those who can be committed for 5-14 days would be deployed first and those that have limited availability would be used to relieve those members that needed a break. On September 29th FEMA representative # 3 related that the assignment would require the participants to be deployed to the East Coast

for two weeks. On October 2nd Mrs. Whitman from the State Emergency Management office in Orlando related that the City of Tampa CERT Team participants would be deployed the following Monday morning (October 4th) for a two week assignment to a neighboring county. Mrs. Whitman also stated that there would be scheduling flexibility for those that could not commit to the entire two weeks. And finally, within one hour of the conversation with Mrs. Whitman, FEMA representative # 3 called Mrs. Goodwin back and related that the assignment was a mandatory 30-day deployment and that there was no flexibility.

- In short, the confusion regarding the length of deployment that transpired between September 6th and October 2nd reduced the number of participants from 18 to six. Many volunteers were very frustrated due to the fact that they had planned for nearly one month to be deployed and were very excited about the opportunity to put their CERT training to good use, only to be left with a feeling of disenfranchisement when the final decision was made on October 2nd regarding the mandatory 30-day deployment length. Since this experience, several of these volunteers no longer participate in CERT activities.
- The need to adapt to change and prepare for the unexpected. The author readily recognizes that the 2004 hurricane season recovery effort in Florida was extremely rare due to the large geographic area that required assistance, coupled with the fact that two additional hurricanes made landfall after the initial call for assistance was made.

4. Part Two: The Deployment of Volunteers

Part two of the case study presents the perceived disorganization and poor volunteer management as reported through interviews with several CERT members that were recruited and employed part time by FEMA to assist in the hurricane recovery efforts throughout the state in 2004. The feedback from each interview is presented individually. The section concludes with a synthesis of the interviews that is presented in a list of lessons learned.

5. Participant # 1

On November 10th and December 5th City of Tampa CERT team member (referred to as participant # 1) provided the following feedback. Participant # 1 related that she was frustrated that it took a month before she could be deployed to provide

assistance. She related that she has been in the field with FEMA for 4 ½ weeks now. She indicated that FEMA is just now opening places in which to put displaced people. People are still living in tents and cars. They are completely destitute from using all their FEMA money and savings on hotels and evacuations following Hurricane Charley. She related that FEMA's goal is to have everyone housed by Thanksgiving; however, she thinks that it will be more like springtime. It would require 250 people to be housed per day until Thanksgiving for FEMA's goal to materialize. Participant # 1 related that she was in Sarasota and Charlotte County the first three weeks of her deployment working in Community Relations. Since then she has been in Hardee, DeSoto and Polk Counties. Participant # 1 related that she is working 14-hour days, seven days a week. She considers the overall effort a waste of time and money.

Participant # 1 related that each county uses different forms and does things differently. She related that in each county that she goes to, she spends a day figuring out who is in charge, who signs her paycheck and what she is supposed to do. Participant # 1 has received only one paycheck so far. There is no hierarchy and no one is responsible for the FEMA personnel. She related that there is no chain of command and everyone and no one is in charge of each office. Very frustrating for participant # 1 is that she and others involved in the recovery efforts are continuously sent out with no training and no specific information, thus whole days are spent trying to figure out what they are supposed to do. Her frustration can best be summed up through her statement that "all information is on a need to know basis, you get the info way after you need to know it." For example, those victims who received RVs to live in were not told how to operate them, resulting in overflowing toilets and sinks.

Participant # 1 related that poor communications plague the entire recovery operations. She explained that people are actually just now coming in to register with FEMA and that last Monday, the Army Corps of Engineers, which had been manning 9 mobile home parks in Brevard County, dumped the parks on FEMA without forewarning. The transfer of the mobile home parks created a state of chaos. In Brevard, she, along with other FEMA workers, were sent only to the red-tagged homes to look for people who needed shelter. The assignment was a waste of time in that the red-tagged homes

are uninhabitable therefore there were no people present. The individuals in charge of making decisions in Broward were not interested in the suggestion made by volunteers, which was to go into the schools and churches to look for those who have become homeless, even though that strategy worked well in other counties.

Participant # 1 related that there has been an ongoing problem regarding getting the temporary FEMA personnel credit cards. She related that there are Disaster Field Offices (DFO's) in Orlando and Charlotte counties and that all FEMA workers have to travel there every time they need money for hotels, vehicles and/or food vouchers. She related that the round trip to the DFO usually takes an entire day depending on where you were located. She related that some individuals, which had not received credit cards had used their own money for a month prior to the DFO's becoming available, and as a result had to go home, even though their assistance was still greatly needed

Participant # 1 also related that there are Disaster Relief Centers (DRC's), which are locations where people can go, to find out how to get help. In Gainesville, the location of the DRC was not advertised and as a result people in that town were all traveling to other communities many miles away in search of assistance. In Polk County there was a big scrolling sign advertising the location of that community's DRC; however, the sign was placed behind a large oak tree on the highway, so it was not readable unless you pulled over next to it.

Participant # 1 related that DeSoto and Hardee Counties have a large Spanish and Haitian population and that there were no FEMA or any other translators available, nor any literature or assistance documents available in Spanish or French. She related that there is also a Korean population that has not even been considered. Very unfortunate is the fact that these individuals do not even know that help is available for them. Despite these unfortunate experiences, participant # 1 related that she plans on staying as long as she is needed.

Participant # 1 related that she has been deployed to seven counties in two months and that she has been working long hours; however, she is tentatively scheduled to have a break from December 24th through the 26th. She related that if you are doing a good job

they send you somewhere else. The problem is that you get ½ a day notice to move, leaving no time to train your replacement, thus the cycle continues regarding learning as you go. Another problem is that there are no full time FEMA representatives or FEMA trainers around. For example, in Martin County two new FEMA part-time workers arrived, one with a time card and the other without. Neither person was trained on how to fill out vouchers; so even though she was just learning herself, she had the most experience and offered to train the new people. Participant # 1 related that she was happy to train these individuals so that they would not encounter the same delays that she had, in that it took six weeks for her to get back her first two vouchers. She related that she had been using her own money, and joked that if you are not independently wealthy don't join FEMA.

Participant # 1 related that the biggest problem has been poor communications, no real organization or coordination and a lack of written Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's). As a result of poor coordination, a duplication of efforts as well as hidden agendas is starting to plague the overall recovery efforts. For example, workers are being sent out to conduct site plans for trailers to be used for temporary housing. The next day two trailers show up at the site, while other requests for trailers have been lost in the system since early October. Another example is that allegedly in some communities, such as Gainesville and Alachua in particular, appear to have decided not to allow any more temporary housing (trailers or RV's) to be delivered in fear that the county will become responsible for payment and up keep of the property after the FEMA 18 month lease expires.

On the condition of anonymity, several FEMA personnel that identified themselves with 20 years of experience stated to participant # 1 that this recovery effort was the most screwed up event that they had ever seen. The FEMA personnel related that the confusion might be attributed to the change in command as a result of the move to put FEMA within the newly created department of Homeland Security (DHS). The personnel went on to add that DHS is set up to do criminal investigations and not disasters. Participant # 1 related that her interaction has been good with the limited number of full-time FEMA personnel that she has seen. However, she informed the

writer that she has filed a complaint against one FEMA worker for his behavior towards her and that this particular individual had a habit of making women cry. She related that she had not heard back from FEMA regarding her complaint.

6. Participant # 2

On November 9th and December 5th City of Tampa CERT team member (referred to as participant # 2) provided the following feedback. Participant # 2 related that he has been in the field with FEMA for 30 days. He related that he initially had a hard time getting into the system and was sent home after 30 days because FEMA was unable to issue him a credit card. Participant # 2 related that after the first two weeks of deployment, FEMA informed him that his per diem compensation request form could not be located. He related that as of December 5th he is still owed \$985 just for per diem. On one occasion, 15 workers were caught totally off guard after they discovered after a meal that their FEMA super card had been deactivated. Participant # 2 added that a shortage of compensation was not limited to FEMA only, in that he worked with four individuals hired by the state that also had not been paid. The day he was driving home, FEMA called to tell him they had found the credit card that he should have been issued and that he could come back. Participant # 2 opted to go home through the holidays and related that he may go back afterwards. He related that being rehired and returning may not be as easy as it appears because first he would have to go through a field officer since there is a hiring freeze at the moment.

Participant # 2 related that he had worked for the Army for many years and was not as frustrated with the disorganization as many of the other volunteers appear to be. He added that there was not really any one person, agency or decision to blame, in that the size of the geographic nature of the recovery mission was just too spread out and too much to manage with the limited resources of the state and FEMA. He related that he had been on the West Coast first and then was sent across the state to Cocoa Beach, which is located on the East Coast. He added that even though he was assigned to the East Coast, he along with others were housed in Orlando and had to commute the 2 ½ hour round trip drive daily because a hotel in Cocoa Beach could not be funded.

Participant # 2 related that the devastation is terrible and that there are countless stories of entire families living in cars for weeks on end, unaware that help was available to them.

Participant # 2 related that there were two main operations that field workers were assigned and that neither job task utilized his CERT training. The first was Community Relations and the other was Individual Assistance, which is also referred to as housing. He related that most all workers started with community relations during the initial days and moved into housing. He explained that housing became a greater concern for FEMA after the Governor stated that every victim would be housed by Thanksgiving. While assigned to community relations he worked 10 hour days, 6 days a week and when assigned to housing he worked 12 hours days, 7 days a week. Participant # 2 explained that community relations involved going from neighborhood to neighborhood checking on the condition of structures and families while distributing informational literature. He explained that he discovered individuals months after the storm passed that did not know about FEMA's assistance. He related that no road maps were provided, thus navigating through the community was difficult at first; however, he overcame that obstacle by using his AAA membership to obtain maps. The informational literature contained FEMA telephone numbers and the location of the Disaster Relief Center (DRC). Participant # 2 related that the DRC was set up like a community fair. Individuals would enter the DRC and receive a number identifying the order of their arrival. A FEMA representative would then call out numbers and inform the individual of the services that may be provided. He related that everyone was advised that they first had to apply for a small business loan yielding a low 2% interest rate or a FEMA grant in the amount of up to \$7,000. In special cases, grants greater than \$7,000 could be requested. Participant # 2 related that it was explained to him that after the President declares a disaster, the Small Business Administration (SBA) could give low interest loans to individuals for needs other than starting a small business. He related that most everyone qualified as a result of nearly everyone being unemployed due to the hurricane's devastation.

Participant # 2 related that when he was assigned to housing, his day would start with a 7:00 a.m. daily briefing where teams were arranged and assignments made for the day. He explained that only FEMA workers could sign the housing leases so the teams

consisted of a FEMA worker and a state worker. He related that each team was given a cellular telephone and a vehicle so they could make appointments to see victims in need of housing. After making contact with the victim, the housing team would inspect the property and measure a 12' X 30' area that was clear of debris, which could be used to set up a temporary trailer. In addition the team would identify the location of the sewer hook up, water and electrical meter box so that measurements could be added to a drawing, so that the plumbers and electricians could bring enough supplies to attach these services to the trailer. In all it would take approximately three days for the trailer to be ready for use. After the trailer was delivered, the team would return to the site, make sure that the trailer was strapped down and have the victim sign a lease agreement. If the victim's property did not provide the amount of space necessary for a trailer to be located, then they would be directed to a trailer park that was constructed by the Corps of Engineers where somewhere between 300 and 400 trailers were located.

7. Participant # 3

On November 9th and December 5th City of Tampa CERT team member (referred to as participant # 3) provided the following feedback. Participant # 3 related that she was frustrated that it took a month before she could be deployed to provide assistance. She related that she has been in the field with FEMA for 4 ½ weeks. She related that she feels as if she is doing good work and helping a lot of people. She related that communication is poor and that not all the efforts have been beneficial. For example, she has been traveling to homes to see if they are inhabitable and found that the Corps of Engineers went in after the hurricanes and put blue tarps over entire roofs even if they didn't need it. Now, all those roofs are leaking where the nails were put in to hold down the tarps. Mold is accumulating rapidly resulting in an increasing number of uninhabitable homes for health reasons, thus also increasing the number of homeless victims. Participant # 3 related that she has encountered entire families living in cars for over three weeks.

Participant # 3 related that she was first directed to go from neighborhood to neighborhood looking for victims that needed assistance. She related that there were no

maps provided for some of the missions, so she took it upon herself to go to the local courthouse to retrieve maps. There she discovered that the building permit office was also in the courthouse and as a result, she was able to ascertain a list of certified contractors that could also be disseminated to victims. Participant # 3 related that housing was a challenge in some communities, in that due to City Ordinances mobile home trailers were not allowed. RV's were allowed, but no mobile homes. Another problem that hindered temporary housing was that many communities were rural and had Green Belt land permits. Some landowners were afraid that their Green Belt privileges would be in jeopardy if they allowed temporary housing sites to be constructed on their land. She related that Mr. Turner, a well known resident in Arcadia, made arrangements to use his land for temporary housing.

Participant # 3 related that since the area that she was assigned was a small town, there were no hotels available and that she had to stay in Sarasota County, which was a three-hour round trip drive. She related that the communities faith based organizations have been the best form of volunteer support. Many church groups assisted with clearing debris and roof repairs. Despite some of the negative experiences, participant # 3 related that she is interested in applying for a permanent position with FEMA.

8. Participant #4

On November 15th and December 5th City of Tampa CERT team member (referred to as participant # 4) provided the following feedback. Participant # 4 related that she was frustrated that it took a month before she could be deployed to provide assistance. She related that she was in the field with FEMA for 30 days and that they were not able to get a credit card to her in that time, so she was sent home. Participant # 4 related that just yesterday (November 14th) she had received a call from FEMA informing her that her credit card was in and that she may head back to Arcadia County. She related that she had been in DeSoto and Hardee Counties. Overall, she related that her deployment had not been a bad experience and that it was government work, therefore it didn't require any particular knowledge, just that you be available. Participant # 4 related that she worked long hours from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. She related that

she and other FEMA personnel had to stay in a hotel in Sarasota County, which was over an hour drive from where they were working, so their time started when they left the hotel and ended when they returned to the hotel.

Participant # 4 related that her assignment was to go house to house to gather information about people's living conditions and identify which storm caused their damage. She would then report back to others that would pass on the information to people who would arrange to provide the necessary assistance to those in need of services. Participant # 4 related that two groups were sent out without any script to follow. Her group was sent out and told to go east of Highway 17 and another group was directed to go west. She related that they just went door to door checking to see if the residents were okay and if they had any special needs. She related that a lot of the houses she checked on had mold problems and that if the atmosphere bothered her when she walked in, she figured it was probably unhealthy for the residents to stay in the house, especially if any of the occupants suffered from respiratory problems. Participant # 4 related that some individuals would make their assessments from their vehicles and not even try to make contact with the homeowners.

Participant # 4 related that she found her work intrinsically rewarding, but didn't want any public recognition, in that she was uncomfortable to receiving a reward as a result of someone's pain and suffering. She related that she is starting to feel some residual effect regarding all the devastation she has witnessed and now carries it with her. Participant # 4 related that she would like to go back out in the field once she takes care of some doctor appointments. She indicated that she really wants to help the folks who are hurting and help the people get back to some sort of decent living conditions. She related that the rich (upper socioeconomic) areas are all recovered because the residents in those neighborhoods have the resources to pay for the necessary repairs and took care of them right away.

Participant # 4 related that it was very frustrating to see how different ethnic groups were treated. For example, she described a predominantly Mexican neighborhood that was devastated by the storm. She related that most of the families there did not have anything left. In one instance, she was with another worker and felt that the other

worker's prejudice got in the way of providing adequate support for a migrant family. She related that they were at a home where a tree had fallen across the roof, shattering a window and leaving a hole in the house. The other worker thought that the house was poorly maintained by the family that was living there (not clean or picked up) and that the landlord had not taken care of it (probably collected on it and left) so they did not deserve housing because they would just make a mess of it. The family included several small children that were living in one bedroom and on the porch because the hole was in the roof in the other bedroom. She was not sure, but believed that this family was denied housing. She felt that there were several instances where personal prejudice resulted in unfair decisions for housing. In addition, there was no literature written in Spanish that could be disseminated until after her third week of deployment. Participant # 4 was troubled when she thought about the amount of time that passed between those three weeks and the four weeks that it took for her to be deployed. She related that the state eventually dispatched two Spanish-speaking interpreters to ride with her. Participant # 4 related that she asked FEMA to allow her to focus on the ethnic neighborhoods because she felt as if those victims were being ignored.

In another example, she said that the Corps of Engineers just wanted to knock down houses that were being lived in and put up trailers with no plans to move the people to temporary housing in the future. The workers just wanted to throw the families out of the houses. Fortunately, they were not allowed to do that. A lot of people living in this migrant neighborhood lived in shacks and old houses. This again is where some individuals brought their own prejudices, in that since these families lived in old run down houses, they did not deserve a decent place to live. Participant # 4 related that there appears to be a lot of money for disaster relief but it is her personal opinion that the farmers are getting a lot of the money and that the migrant poor are out of luck.

Participant # 4 related that working with FEMA has been a challenge. She explained that many of the full-time federal workers did not want to work with the volunteers and would not share information. In addition, the work schedule regarding what hours they could work would change without any forewarning. One day it was 7 to 6, the next day it was 7 to 7, then they would call and say that you could only work 10-

hour days. Also challenging was when they would call and say to her that she had to take the next day off, but she couldn't take the day off because she would always have work that needed to be performed the next day.

Participant # 4 related that HUD representatives are there but she didn't work with them. She related that it appeared that they were not doing much besides having meetings with Code Enforcement personnel and long range planning groups. She related that the way it looks, the displaced people will be in the trailers through the next hurricane season. All of the apartments are taken in areas that were flattened. Participant # 4 related one person from a strike team say that in Arcadia they are not doing anything to help people find homes. It appeared to this individual that roadblocks are being put up to prevent FEMA from going in and providing assistance. Participant # 4 related that she overheard a man from Atlanta, who she thought was a FEMA contractor, say that the city is not doing anything to help the displaced because they are hoping the people will just leave.

9. Lessons Learned

The lessons learned as a result of the feedback that was provided by the deployment participants include:

- The need to enhance both internal and external communications at all levels. Internal communications will reduce the duplication of efforts such as two trailers arriving at the same site, as well as the loss of information that resulted in no trailer showing up at an approved site. Better internal communications can also reduce negative public relations and unsubstantiated speculation, such as the belief that certain communities would not allow temporary housing to be delivered due to economic reasons, when in fact it appears that such decisions were based solely on existing City Ordinances and not unsympathetic officials. External communications such as printing literature in several languages and having translators assigned to applicable neighborhoods would reduce the number of victims that went months before learning that assistance was available for them. Employing different methods to provide external communication such as using airplanes with banners would be helpful in reaching the entire community and making sure that no one is left behind or forgotten. This method would especially be beneficial for individuals that may be out trying to gather ice, water and food when the community relation's field workers arrive in their neighborhood to make assessments and disseminate FEMA assistance literature. Needless to say the banners

should be in several different languages. Checklist and/or translation guides should be printed and given to victims so that they can easily identify their needs and better communicate with field workers.

- The need to integrate the FEMA community relations and housing fieldwork curriculum into the CERT training so that participants could be productive immediately after deployment.
- The need to have individuals assigned only to field training duties so those new employees that may not be clear on the procedures themselves are not responsible for training others.
- The need to write and disseminate Standard Operating Guidelines (SOG's) and/or Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) for all field assignments. This will standardize all operations and reduce the down time associated with learning new systems as a result of different counties operating under different rules. Standard Operating Procedures will eliminate confusion such as, is it appropriate to assess structural damage from a vehicle, or should interior examinations be required?
- The need to leave field workers in one county until all the work in that location has been completed. A loss of productivity occurs at both the new county and the previous one as a result of individuals having to learn new contacts, systems and territories.
- The need to provide temporary housing for the field workers in the counties that they are assigned. As a result of the devastation there were no hotels available for field workers. This situation caused many workers to use approximately three hours of each day traveling to and from their hotel and their assigned territory, thus resulting in a loss of 18-21 hours a week.
- The need to correct the problem associated with providing compensation, per diem and credit cards to field workers in a timely manner. Two trained field workers were sent home after a credit card could not be approved to them, only to be called right back and asked to return. Neither worker returned, although both of these individuals related that they would have stayed longer had they not been asked to leave.
- The need for adequate human resource infrastructures (DFO's) to be in place prior to field workers arrival. Not having the adequate resources for workers required them to travel unnecessary long distances for necessities such as food vouchers. Any additional travel reduces the amount of time that could be spent in the field providing assistance.

- The need for decision-makers to accept feedback from field workers. It was reported that individuals in charge of making decisions in Broward were not interested in the suggestions that were made by volunteers, which was to go into the schools and churches to look for those who had become homeless, even though that strategy worked well in other counties. Instead, workers were directed to continue to respond to areas and houses that were unoccupied due to damage, thus being unable to make contact with victims that were unaware that FEMA was in the community ready to provide assistance to them.
- The need for elected officials not to make unrealistic promises. Many field workers felt that they were being viewed as personally responsible by the victims for not having them in housing after the Governor stated that every victim would be housed by Thanksgiving.
- The need to provide field workers with community maps. Many workers were sent into unfamiliar areas without maps resulting in unproductive time driving in rural areas that had no victims.
- The need to provide field workers with a list of certified contractors and licensed roofers, tree trimmers, electricians, etc. that could be passed out to victims so that they could verify reputable workers from unscrupulous individuals that may be out trying to take advantage of the situation.
- The need for homeowners and field workers to take steps to protect and prevent structures from the accumulation of mold. Instead of a reduction in the number of victims that needed temporary housing, an increase was experienced as a result of mold forming several weeks after the event.
- The need to make sure that all victims have an expedited appeal process to make sure that any prejudices are not resulting in a denial of assistance. It may be difficult to determine if damage was caused by a storm or were preexisting conditions; however, the burden of proof should not rest solely on the victim. If no neighbors or prior government code violation record can substantiate the fact that the damage was preexisting, the individual should be treated with respect like all other victims.

C. SUMMARY

Collectively the case studies identified several potential areas of volunteer management that could be improved. One area of improvement involves volunteer retention and management. Emergency managers must remember to treat volunteers with the same respect on the days when paid resources are available as they do on days when

paid resources are not available. A possible solution to improve on scene volunteer management could be to integrate volunteer management as an operational component of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Local communities should also restructure their existing Incident Command System (ICS) procedures to include a liaison for on scene volunteer management.

Another area of concern is that volunteers perceive they have a difficult time proving themselves and their skill levels to paid responders. Emergency managers, paid responders and volunteers could each benefit from having a more thorough understanding of the other group's skills, contributions and expectations. A possible solution could be to develop and implement educational programs for managers, paid responders and volunteers. The lesson plans should clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of volunteers and how volunteers will be expected to assist paid responders during emergency situations.

In addition, volunteers perceive that they are not valued and accepted by paid responders. Collaborative environments will not be successful unless there are ample opportunities for interaction. Policies should be adopted that will create inclusive situations for volunteers to interface with their local paid responders. A possible solution could be to restructure the organization to include a volunteer liaison officer in each district and on each shift. The liaison officers could schedule neighborhood meetings and other community outreach initiatives that will increase interaction and exposure. The liaison officers could use training sessions and large multi-agency disaster exercises for team building opportunities.

Finally, it is important to reiterate that this scope of this thesis was to research the perceived working relationships between volunteers and paid responders from the perspective of only volunteers. Naturally, there is another perspective that should be investigated to provide additional information that may confirm or expound on the lists of lessons learned.

V. SURVEY RESULTS

The purpose of this research was to examine volunteer's perceptions regarding their acceptance and working relationships between them and paid responders. Participants' self-reports on a demographic questionnaire were used to verify that each participant had previously worked with paid responders. Only data collected from volunteers that had previously worked with paid responders were used in the data analysis. This chapter discusses the results of a self-reported 13-item questionnaire.

A. PARTICIPANT RESPONSES

There were a total of 50 CERT volunteers that filled out the demographic questionnaire. Of those 100 percent met the requirements of prior working experiences with paid responders. All participants completed all items on the questionnaire. Of the 50 participants, 6 (12%) volunteers reported that the paid responders did not make them feel welcomed when they arrived on scene. Twelve (24%) of the volunteers reported that the paid responders made them feel like they were in the way. Twenty four (48%) of the volunteers reported that the paid responders did not task them immediately; however, 50 (100%) reported that they were tasked within 0-3 hours. Eighteen (36%) of the volunteers reported that once tasked, their assignments did not match their training or skill level. Forty six (92%) of the volunteers reported that they shared equally in the work load. Eleven (22%) of the volunteers reported that they worked less than the paid responders and 10 (20%) reported that they worked harder than the paid responders. Of the paid responders that the volunteers worked with, thirty (60%) reported that the paid responders were helpful, eighteen (36%) reported that the paid responders were somewhat helpful, and 2 (4%) reported that the paid responders were unhelpful. Thirty five (70%) rated their overall experience working with paid responders as positive and fifteen (30%) rated their overall experience working with paid responders as neutral. No volunteers rated their overall experience as negative. All participants reported that they would feel comfortable working with the same group of paid responders during another event. Frequencies and percentages of the participants are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Frequencies and Percentages of Volunteer Responses

Volunteer Response	Frequency	Percentage
Felt Un-Welcomed	6	12
Felt in the Way	12	24
Tasked Immediately	24	48
Assignments Not Matched with Skill Level	18	36
Shared Equally in the Workload	46	92
Worked Less than responders	11	22
Worked Harder than responders	10	20
Responders were Helpful	30	60
Responders were Somewhat Helpful	18	36
Responders were Unhelpful	2	4
Good Overall Experience	35	70
Neutral Overall Experience	15	30

Note. $N = 50$.

B. SUMMARY

The results of the questionnaire provide insight from the perspective of citizen volunteers from a metropolitan CERT regarding their perceived acceptance between them and paid responders. Both positives and areas of possible improvement were identified through the analysis. The positives include 92 percent of volunteers felt that they shared equally in the workload, 88 percent were made to feel welcomed upon arrival, and 100 percent reported that they would feel comfortable working with the same responders

during another event. Areas that may require further review could be associated with exploring the perceived reasons why 24 percent of the volunteers felt as if they were in the way, 20 percent felt as if they worked harder than the paid responders, 36 percent were given assignments that did not match their skill level or training, only 48 percent were tasked immediately, only 60 percent reported that paid responders were helpful, and only 70 percent reported an overall good experience.

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VI RECOMMENDATIONS/CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION

The previous chapters of this thesis discussed several issues that emergency managers should consider when discussing if volunteers should be used to increase their community's workforce capacity, and if so how to collect objective data to assist with identifying potential problems regarding inclusion prior to developing policies and implementation programs. This research used both questionnaires and interviews to collect data from volunteers. Three major findings of the analysis include the perception that even though tasking volunteers was slow and when tasked the assignment was inconsistent with their skill level and experience volunteers reported that overall they had a good experience.

There are three primary issues that decision makers should consider regarding whether or not volunteers should be used. These issues include the need for volunteers during large scale incidents, the liability associated with volunteers and the need to adopt a comprehensive screening process before individuals are accepted as volunteers. In addition to the primary issues, three courses of action will be discussed to assist community leaders when deciding to embrace a culture of integrating volunteers into their community's disaster management plans or whether to keep things the way they are and work out any volunteer overload or shortage problems as they come up. The first course of action would be to maintain the status quo, the second would be to start a volunteer program without adopting a comprehensive screening process and the third would be to start a volunteer program and adopt a comprehensive screening process. The chapter concludes with several recommendations to consider if the decision is made to integrate volunteers.

B. PRIMARY ISSUES

1. Issue One: The Need for Volunteers during Large Scale Disasters

As previously stated managing large scale disasters will be very labor intensive and require individuals with different sets of technical and professional skills. Volunteers have proven to be a valuable resource for public safety managers to draw from when existing resources are depleted and/or when specialized skills and talents are required for technical operations. For example, many municipalities understand that they need a back-up plan if their communication channels fail or get overloaded or they need to communicate with disparate agencies, and are recognizing the importance of volunteer amateur radio operators and the hundreds of channels that can come into play (Thompson & Bono, 1993). Another example of vital volunteer involvement can be reinforced through the Whittier, CA. Police Department's "170 volunteers that provide help to people speaking over 40 different languages for whom dealing with a law enforcement agency could otherwise be a frightening experience" (Jensen, 1998, p. 104).

2. Issue Two: The Liability Associated with Volunteers

Few people if any would volunteer to help out in times of need if there were no protection provided to them from potential liability resulting in their willingness to provide medical care to someone in need. Good Samaritan laws provide liability protection to "encourage a passerby to stop and assist someone who needs emergency care" (Bergeron, Bizjak, Krause & LeBaudour, 2005, p. 18). Good Samaritan laws also apply to employed volunteers that have performed within their level of training from being sued if the condition of someone that they were assisting worsens.

The Good Samaritan law on the other hand does not protect the sponsoring agency if the volunteer becomes injured. In this case, most state statutes protect volunteers by ensuring that agencies, which use volunteers, secure some type of worker's compensation coverage. For example, Florida State Statute Chapter 440 protects volunteers that become injured by requiring local municipalities to carry Worker's Compensation for all volunteers. In addition to Good Samaritan laws and volunteer

Worker's Compensation, municipalities can also reduce their vulnerability associated with volunteer liability by purchasing "liability insurance coverage for volunteers. Legal experts concur that organizations should purchase liability insurance to underwrite the reasonable risks associated with volunteer involvement" (McCurley and Lynch, 1996, p. 234).

3. Issue Three: The Need to Adopt a Comprehensive Screening Process

Public safety agencies have been tasked with hardening their internal processes. Entry level personnel accountability controls can be achieved through a comprehensive pre-employment screening process that emphasizes the importance of an extensive background check (Jensen, 1998). If terrorists were able to infiltrate public duty uniform to facilitate a devastating surprise attack. Drogin (2005) cited that "so far, about 40 Americans who sought positions at U.S. intelligence agencies have been red-flagged and turned away for possible ties to terrorist groups" (March 8, LA Times). In addition to securing emergency vehicles and uniforms, public safety agencies must also protect their information technology infrastructure from cyber attacks caused by internal security breeches.

C. COURSES OF ACTION

1. Course of Action One: Do not Use Volunteers

The first course of action would be to maintain the status quo and not support the implementation of a volunteer program. The only possible advantage associated with the status quo is that communities would not have to budget for volunteer Worker's Compensation coverage and liability insurance protection. In contrast, three disadvantages associated with the status quo decision will be identified. The first is that public safety organizations will be missing out on the ability to increase their everyday routine workforce capabilities for a minimal cost. The second is that a meaningful opportunity for citizens to contribute and become involved in their community will be withheld. And the third is that Incident Commanders will not have the capabilities of

assigning pre-screened and trained volunteers to supplement the limited number of available paid resources immediately following a large-scale disaster. Members of a volunteer program can be used to supplement vital operations such as scene security and management of spontaneously arriving volunteers. In addition, the decision not to implement a volunteer program would be out of sync with the national trend regarding the integration of volunteers as a component of the homeland security national strategy.

2. Course of Action Two: Use Volunteers without Adopting a Comprehensive Screening Process

The second course of action would be to implement a volunteer program without adopting a comprehensive screening process. The advantage to this course of action is that public safety agencies could increase their workforce capabilities at a minimal cost, which could be limited to the non-negotiable worker's compensation coverage, which in the state of Florida is \$2 per hour per volunteer and liability insurance protection. The disadvantage associated with this decision is that a recognized process to filter out unsuitable applicants would be unused. Screening processes such as fingerprint cards, criminal history background checks, polygraph examinations, drug screening tests and psychological evaluations are reliable and valid methods that may be able to pre-identify individuals that exhibit personality traits that could potentially bring discredit to an agency's professional image, place a municipality in an increased position of liability due to a prior criminal conviction and/or identify persons who are on federal terrorist watch lists.

3. Course of Action Three: Use Volunteers and Adopt a Comprehensive Screening Process

The third course of action would be to implement a volunteer program with a comprehensive screening process and is recommended by the writer as the appropriate course. As mentioned above in Course of Action Two, one advantage to implementing a volunteer program is that public safety agencies could increase their workforce capabilities at a minimal cost associated with worker's compensation coverage and liability insurance protection. However, with an additional one time expenditure of

approximately \$47 for a fingerprint card and National Crime Information Center (NCIC) criminal history background check, agencies can identify an out-of-state convicted felon, an identity thief and/or an individual on the federal terrorist watch list. In addition, for approximately \$26.50 for a 5-panel drug screening test and \$185 for a psychological evaluation, agencies can further improve the integrity of their personnel selection process.

One possible disadvantage with this course of action is associated with a potential civil liberty issue related to the criminal history background check. On the surface, it can be argued that any civil liberty issue is null and void as a result of the volunteer applicant providing informed consent to participate in a background check by signing the volunteer application. However, since there are no national standards that guide the screening process of public safety volunteers the issue might be challenged in courts, and as such has not been legally defined. Another possible issue related to this course of action is that the proposed screening process is not 100% effective, in that if a terrorist group planted someone as a volunteer without a criminal background, they could get around the entire issue.

D. RISKS AND COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH USING VOLUNTEERS

1. Risks Associated with Using Volunteers

- Depending on the type of assignment, volunteers can increase an agency's liability to the point of requiring the purchase of volunteer insurance coverage.
- Volunteers will increase an agency's workers compensation costs.
- Volunteers have been known to become over zealous and impersonate sworn personnel.
- Volunteers will require training, supervision and discipline just like paid personnel.
- Volunteers may succumb to temptation and access restricted areas and/or databases without authorization.

- A terrorist or terrorist plant without a criminal history can easily gain access to the internal processes, systems and procedures of a public safety agency to conduct physical attacks, cyber-attacks and/or surveillance on our nation's counter-terrorist efforts.

2. Risks Associated with a Standardized Background Screening Process

- A standardized screening process is not fail proof and will not identify terrorists or terrorist's plants that do not have a criminal history or are not on the federal terrorist watch lists.
- Privacy issues related to criminal history background checks are not a risk due to the fact that each applicant provides informed consent as part of the application process.

3. Gains Associated with Using Volunteers

- Volunteers provide the ability for public safety agencies to increase their workforce capacity without the related cost associated with salaries and benefits.
- Volunteers can perform non-policing functions such as driving police vehicles that can be marked as out-of-service to and from vehicle maintenance shops for unexpected repairs and/or scheduled preventative maintenance appointments, assist with traffic control during large events, assist with traffic control by placing four-way stop signs at intersections with malfunctioning traffic signals after windy storms and hurricanes, respond to vehicle accident scenes to wait until tow trucks arrive and remove damaged vehicles, etc. All these activities allow trained personnel to focus their efforts on providing emergency services and law enforcement activities.
- Volunteers can help corral and redirect other volunteers that spontaneously converge onto large-scale disaster scenes, thus indirectly assisting law enforcement with scene security.

4. Gains Associated with a Standardized Background Screening Process

- A criminal history background check is the only way to positively identify an individual that willfully fails to document prior criminal convictions on an application.

- A standardized screening process will prevent individuals that were turned down at one agency from applying at other agencies until one that doesn't conduct background checks is identified.
- A background check using the NCIC database will identify individuals that are on their terrorist watch lists.
- This proactive approach may be able to deter and/or prevent a dozen or so terrorists disguised as volunteers, from infiltrating a public safety agency with the mission to exploit operational vulnerabilities to facilitate an attack that could kill thousands of people.

E. RECOMMENDATIONS

If the decision is made to integrate volunteers into the community's disaster management plan several recommendation are listed to assist planners with developing a strategy to address the needs and concerns of both population's volunteers and paid responders. These recommendations include:

1. Restructure Disaster Management Plans to Include A Volunteer Component

There appears to be no logic in having hundreds of willing and trained volunteer resources and no clear way to tap those resources to assist paid responders during disasters. The intent of this recommendation is to encourage emergency managers to review their existing disaster management plans and restructure them if necessary to include a section that addresses volunteer support. Volunteer organizations should be invited to participate in the strategic planning process to demonstrate to the local volunteer community that they are being recognized and accepted as a valuable component of the overall emergency response structure. Volunteer notification procedures and on-scene volunteer management plans should be discussed and outlined in the volunteer support section of the emergency management plan.

a. Volunteer Notification Procedures

Volunteer organizations are managed through an internal chain of command structure that subdivides the organization into groups to minimize span of control constraints and improve internal communications. Common routes of

communication within volunteer organizations occur through email messages, monthly meetings and/or telephone tree notification systems. Effective and rapid communication is critical during disasters. The telephone tree notification system increases communication times by splitting up the workload of calling all members of an organization. The emergency response plan must identify primary and secondary points of contact for each participating volunteer organization so rapid notifications can occur. Alternative numbers (i.e. pagers, cell phones, work numbers and home numbers) should also be documented as part of the plan. To initiate the volunteer notification procedures, the Emergency Operations Center's (EOC) volunteer liaison should first locate an appropriate staging area (i.e. shopping center or super market parking lot, etc) where all volunteers can be directed to meet. The liaison should then call the primary or secondary point of contact for each organization and instruct them to initiate the telephone tree notification system.

b. On-Scene Volunteer Management

Volunteers can provide the human resources necessary to increase a community's workforce capacity and capabilities during disasters. National volunteer organizations such as the Red Cross and United Way have traditionally supported paid responders by establishing and staffing Volunteer Coordination Centers (VCC). The problem is that these centers are usually constructed several days after the incident and several miles away from the disaster site. These resources are beneficial for extended recovery operations, but have no impact regarding on-site volunteer management. Emergency managers should recruit local volunteer organizations to assist with staffing an on-site Volunteer Reception Center (VRC) to manage spontaneous arriving volunteers that converge onto the disaster area until the national organizations are functionally capable of staffing an off-site VCC. CERT members should be tasked with providing the resources to staff the on-site VRC since a component of their training covers volunteer management. By working collaboratively with all participating volunteer organizations, job tasks based on specific training and skills such as CERT, VIPS, and/or MRC can be predetermined so that the appropriately skilled volunteer can be quickly tasked, equipped and transported to the incident.

2. Develop Educational Programs for Volunteers and Paid Responders

The intent of this recommendation is to develop educational programs that will facilitate the integration of a volunteer program into an all paid emergency response organization by reducing anxiety, stress and resistance through open communication and productive dialogue. During the first phase of training, workshops on successful collaborative models should be scheduled for all stakeholders and participants. A team approach to identifying problems and providing alternative solutions should be adopted as a policy so that all members are able to provide input and actively participate in all decision-making processes. Refer to Appendix F for a copy of Thomas, Korinek, McLaughlin, and Williams (2000) seven features that are fundamental for inclusive programs to be successful. Curriculum should also be developed to address the training needs and answer the questions of both volunteers and paid responders. The goals of the educational programs should be to:

- Educate paid responders regarding the task-specific training of certain volunteer programs such as CERT and MRC.
- Educate paid responders regarding the many tasks that volunteers can perform at emergency scenes, thus freeing up paid resources to focus exclusively on saving the lives of their comrades and/or other victims.
- Educate paid responders regarding the specialized skills that some volunteers possess such as amateur radio capabilities, which will be vital if the paid responders lose their primary mode of communication.
- Reduce paid responders anxiety about job security by assuring them that the use of volunteers will not cause a reduction of paid personnel.
- Educate paid responders regarding the financial savings associated with using volunteers and that the savings may be redirected and used to employ more paid resources.
- Educate paid responders regarding the benefits associated with sharing volunteer resources between neighboring counties during disasters.
- Educate volunteers regarding the organizational structure, rules and regulations and standard operating procedures of the paid organization that they are supporting.

- Educate volunteers regarding the management principle's chain of command, span of control and unity of command.
- Educate volunteers regarding emergency scene protocols that are identified through the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Require volunteers to successfully pass the NIMS 100, 200 and 700 first responder level on-line courses.
- Educate volunteers regarding their roles and responsibilities during normal everyday operations as well as during emergency conditions.

3. Restructure the Organization to Include Volunteer Liaisons

The intent of this recommendation is to restructure the organization to include a volunteer support branch that identifies specific Fire Officers to serve as volunteer liaisons. A strategy should be developed that will partner neighborhood volunteer groups such as CERT, VIPS and/or NW with their closest fire station and/or law enforcement substation. A volunteer liaison should be assigned to partner with a selected volunteer team leader. Working through the volunteer liaisons and team leaders, monthly meetings can be scheduled at the stations to allow volunteers to visit and interact with paid responders, thus creating the ability to develop positive social relationships that can transfer into productive working relationships during disasters. These social experiences will allow paid responders to personally get to know the volunteers that live close by and will be available to assist if there is a disaster that affects their neighborhood.

The liaisons should be responsible for the activation of their neighborhood volunteers when needed by contacting their assigned team leaders. The liaisons and team leaders should maintain radio communication throughout the deployment phase to facilitate volunteer management. Volunteer amateur radio operators can be used to link the liaisons with the various team leaders. The volunteer team leaders can communicate with their volunteers by using unlicensed shorter range Family Radio Service (FRS) radios for communication, preferably with an earpiece so the wearer can audibly hear during noisy conditions.

Local public safety administrators should understand that volunteers will increase their overall workforce capacity; however, integrating volunteers into a community's

disaster response plan will require additional management processes and training requirements for programs to be effective and successful. Managers must remember that they are breaking ground with a new concept of using volunteers for homeland security and homeland protection, so it is recommended to start by assigning simple tasks such as replenishing consumables at the rehab sector, assisting with crowd and/or traffic control, running equipment and supplies as needed, performing basic clean-up details, serving as scribes for managers, etc. to allow the volunteers to contribute while at the same time providing an opportunity for paid responders to become familiar with having non-traditional personnel around areas that have traditionally been reserved for only paid responders.

4. Implement Team Building Strategies

The intent of this recommendation is to write policies that will open lines of communication and interactions between volunteers and paid responders. The liaison officers suggested in recommendation 3 should be utilized as the point of contact for all team building opportunities. An analysis of the community should be conducted to locate the neighborhoods that support structured volunteer groups and assign paid responders that exhibit a willingness to accept the concept of integrating volunteers into disaster management to those locations. A “buddy system” should be used to team up paid responders with neighborhood volunteers to help with developing personal relationships.

A policy should be adopted that would require at least one public safety administrator and several mid level managers to attend the final training exercise and/or graduation ceremony of programs such as CERT and VIPS. New programs have a better chance of acceptance when the interest and respect filter down through the ranks. These exercises could be a way for volunteers to demonstrate what they have learned and are capable of and that they are serious about assisting wherever the paid responders assign them. Finding time for interaction is an important first step in developing lasting relationships.

Most public safety agencies participate in at least one charity drive each year (i.e. Habitat for Humanity, Paint Your Heart Out, Great American Teach-In, Gold Shield,

Sincerely Santa, MDA, etc.). These types of community outreach efforts create valuable opportunities to have volunteers work side by side with paid responders for a common cause. These informal interactions will be helpful in developing the mutual respect and acceptance that will be needed to transfer seamlessly into effective formal working relationships that will be beneficial during a crisis.

Emergency managers should capitalize on large scale training exercises to practice and evaluate their on-site volunteer management procedures. Training exercises can also allow planners to evaluate the effectiveness of the aforementioned recommendations to improve the working relationships between volunteers and paid responders through personal observations and post training critiques. Volunteers want to be engaged and contribute. Large scale training exercises creates an opportunity in which volunteers can feel empowered through active participation.

F. CONCLUSION

Managing large scale disasters will be extremely labor intensive and quickly overwhelm the existing paid human resources of even the best prepared communities. It is therefore incumbent upon community leaders to take advantage of the many talents that volunteers possess to increase their overall emergency response work force capacity. Marketing strategies should be used to advertise and direct community volunteers towards service in one of the nationally sponsored programs. Emergency managers should collaborate with their county's Citizen Corps regarding strategies on how best to integrate community volunteers into the disaster management plans.

Collectively, the case studies portrayed that the volunteers, who had worked with paid responders in Florida during the recovery phase of the 2004 hurricane season felt that they were not valued and appreciated. However, the analysis of the volunteer questionnaire identified that the degree of alienation was not severe enough to prevent any of the volunteers from working alongside the same paid responders if required. These differences may be attributed to the fact that the questionnaire was given to volunteers who responded within 72 hours of the disaster while two of the case studies

focused on individuals that were deployed months later. Since this research was conducted in a metropolitan area, further research is needed to assess the differing degrees of acceptance of volunteers in rural and suburban communities. Additional research should also be conducted to evaluate the longer term efficacy of the suggested recommendations towards improving the working relationships between volunteers and paid responders. Finally, since this research focused on the perceived working relationships between volunteers and paid responders from the perspective of only volunteers, the other perspective from paid responders should be investigated to provide additional information that may confirm or expound on the results and lists of lessons learned presented in this thesis.

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APPENDIX A

CERT MEMBER DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY

Direction: Please respond to each item by filling in the space provided for items 1-3.

1. How many years have you been a volunteer? _____
2. How many opportunities have you had to work with paid First Responders in a non-emergency capacity? _____
3. How many opportunities have you had to work with paid First Responders during and/or after a disaster? _____

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APPENDIX B

VOLUNTEER/FIRST RESPONDER INTERACTION QUESTIONNAIRE

Please circle the appropriate response(s) for all items 1-13.

Did you feel welcome by the paid First Responders when you arrived on scene?

Yes No

Did the paid First Responders make you feel like you were in the way?

Yes No

Did the paid First Responders task you immediately?

Yes No

How long did you wait before being tasked with an assignment?

0-3 hours 3-6 hours 6-9 hours over 9 hours

Did your assigned task match your training and skill level?

Yes No

Did you feel like you shared equally in the workload?

Yes No

Did you work less than the paid First Responders did?

Yes No

Did you work harder than the paid First Responders did?

Yes No

Which group(s) did you work alongside with?

Police Firefighters National Guard Personnel Other Volunteers

10. Were the group(s) that you worked with?

Helpful Somewhat Helpful Unhelpful

11. Circle the group(s) that you identified in item # 9 that made you feel unwelcome:

Police Firefighters National Guard Personnel Other Volunteers

How would you rate your overall experience working with the group(s)?

Positive Neutral Negative?

Would you be comfortable working with the same group(s) during another event?

Yes No

APPENDIX C

THE SERT COORDINATOR SENDS A REQUEST FOR HELP

There is an extreme need for State Community Relations personnel to go into FEMA/State Joint CR Teams. They go door to door in a major impacted area giving a brief speech about how to sign up for FEMA/State Help via the FEMA 800 Teleregistration Number and /or going to the Disaster Recovery Center (DRC) to sign up for help. Plus they hand out some other literature.

We need a whole lot of people for the state part of the effort. Living conditions will be omcast & people need to be able to spend a minimum of 5+ days and preferably up to 14 days on scene. AT PRESENT THE PLAN IS FOR THOSE FLORIDA CERT TEAMS WHO SIGN UP THROUGH THE NUMBERS BELOW TO BE ASSIGNED IN THEIR LOCAL COUNTIES OR NEARBY AREAS FOR THE MOST PART. THEY WILL BE BROUGHT TOGETHER LOCALLY & TRAINED LOCALLY. While the Feds are also recruiting CERT teams (for pay) we in Florida CERT need to live up to our commitment to our citizens and our FLORIDA CERT TEAMS WHO WILL BE WORKING UNDER THIS REQUEST WILL ALSO GET PAID (roughly \$18/hr).

FLORIDA SERT CONTACTS FOR THIS CR ASSIGNMENT;

Sheila Kosier --- 850-591-1370 (850-410-3160)

Ted Keith --- 202-431-7981 (yes 202 is correct) (850-413-9817)

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APPENDIX D

THE SERT COORDINATOR SENDS A REVISED REQUEST FOR HELP

Dear Citizen Corps Coordinators,

There is a need for Community Relations Personnel following the aftermath of Hurricane Frances. Once it is safe to go into impacted areas, we will need this additional staff to contact disaster victims and encourage them to teleregister with FEMA and provide State Assistance contact information. Also, these personnel will be looking for unmet needs and other major issues relating to this hurricane. Activation periods will be for several days, possibly up to two weeks. We are requesting that you recruit your Citizen Corps volunteers to assist the citizens of Florida. While these Community Relations personnel will be representatives of the State of Florida, these individuals will be employees of the Department of Homeland Security/ FEMA.

Citizen Corps volunteers that wish to serve MUST meet the following criteria:

- Must be a United States Citizen.
- Must be at least 18 years of age.
- Must be run through a Background Check
- Must be physically able to work in a disaster area without refrigeration for medications and have the ability to work in the outdoors all day.
- Must be able to work long hours under arduous conditions (e.g., individuals may reside in an emergency tent city/ base camp rather than a hotel during their assignment.)
- Workers may be exposed to mold, high heat, humidity, and insects.
- Must be able to work in the vicinity of disaster debris, damaged facilities, and related adverse conditions.
- This assignment is temporary and is a paid assignment.
- Must not be self deployed. Individuals who self deploy will not be reimbursed.

Role of a Community Relations Officer:

- Establish and maintain positive working relationships with disaster affected communities and the citizens of those communities.
- Collect and disseminate information and make referrals for appropriate assistance.
- Identification of potential issues within the community and reporting to appropriate persons.
- Convey a positive image of disaster operations to government officials, community organizations, and the general public.
- Perform outreach with community leaders on available Federal Disaster Assistance.

Role of State and Local Citizen Corps Council

- Recruit qualified individuals from existing Citizen Corps volunteer roles (e.g., CERT, VIPS, MRCs, other local Citizen Corps groups)
- Provide names of qualified volunteers to the State EOC.

(NOTE FOR FLCERT TEAMS not affiliated with a Citizen Council --- The CERT PROGRAM COORDINATOR SHOULD ASSEMBLE THE LIST OF AVAILABLE PERSONNEL UNDER THIS MESSAGE & e-mail it to Ted Keith at the e-mail below.)

Upon Arrival at the deployment sites (declared counties), the recruit will:

- Be sworn in as a Federal Employee.
- Be given training on Community Relations in the county before you are deployed to the field.
- Receive training on deployment procedures and requirements
- Be compensated for the period of employment as a level C – 1 reservist (\$18.88 per hour)
- Receive per-diem at the local rate, if the reservist must deploy further than 50 miles from their home of record.
- Airfare and/ or other transportation to the county will be by invitational travel (paid by FEMA)
- Note: individual must save all travel related receipts for “vouchering”.
- Be issued a state and FEMA badges.
- Be issued a temporary government credit card (You are expected to use this card for all travel related expenses such as airfare, lodging, meals, gas, etc. and to pay all bills after reimbursement.)

Procedures:

- Citizen Corps coordinators are to identify and complete a list of available individuals. This list along with Point of Contact information is to be forwarded to Ted Keith at Ted.Keith@dca.state.fl.us
- A Federal Application Package will then be forwarded to the Citizen Corps Coordinator for distribution and will be completed for each individual approved for deployment.
- FEMA will process applicants and notify Individuals of deployment assignments within the State of Florida.

APPENDIX E

THE SERT COORDINATOR SENDS A LETTER OUTLINING DEPLOYMENT

9/9/04 – INSTRUCTIONS FOR CERT PERSONNEL TO SIGN FOR PAID DUTY STATUS IN COMMUNITY RELATIONS ACTIVITIES

The following information is provided to assist in processing CERT team member applications for Federal employment under the Disaster Assistance Employee program.

If you have members in your area desiring employment as Florida Community Relations personnel please follow the following steps:

1. Download attachment (Federal Employment Package) 2. Have your individuals complete the application 3. Forms I-9 and SF-67 (employment affidavit) must be notarized on the bottom of each of the front pages of the form 4. Have your CERT Team members hand in the completed applications to you as CERT TEAM Leader. 5. Please FED-EX completed and notarized forms to Tallahassee

Address for FED-Exing federal forms:

Attn: Felicia Peterson
Department of Community Affairs
Sadowski Building
2555 Shumard Oak Blvd
Tallahassee, FL 32399

Once these forms are completed and NOTARIZED, you're CERT Teams members are considered FEMA Disaster Assistance Employees and are eligible for training and deployment. We will contact you as the CERT Team leader to inform you of the deployment and training locations for your teams. FEMA has instructors stationed throughout the state who will facilitate training. If you have questions, please contact our staff via e-mail at: two4fla@comcast.net

NOTE: There are only the first six files attached. We will be sending you the last two in a separate email.

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APPENDIX F

Seven features that are fundamental for inclusive programs to be successful (Thomas, Korinek, McLaughlin, and Williams, 2000) include:

1. A Collaborative Culture that Values Teamwork

- Successful inclusive environments require members of the group to share responsibility and work together to support program initiatives.
- Collaboration is only feasible if the overall culture supports and practices professional collaboration.
- Visible leadership at the highest levels is vital to the success of the inclusion initiative. Administrators must sanction the task force and should intentionally seek members who bring diverse perspectives.

2. A Shared Leadership

- For inclusive environments to be effective, leadership must be exercised by everyone involved in the process.
- Shared leadership encourages greater participation, stronger commitment, ongoing support, more creative problem solving and better program monitoring and improvement.
- Elements of effective leadership include the ability to establish direction, align key participants, motivate and inspire others, and produce useful changes in the organization.

3. A Shared Vision

- Enables teams to be focused and productive while maintaining their individual and shared commitment to develop and grow over time.
- Shared perspective facilitates teamwork, focuses energy and aids decision-making.

4. Comprehensive Planning

- Without a long range plan for improvement, programs are prone to start over each year with new ideas and strategies. This increases frustration and non-meaningful changes. Inclusive environments need long term commitments.

- To learn from experience, teams should study successful programs, review their program guides and other written materials and talk openly regarding any concerns.
- There are many program components. Typically they include program goals and objectives, community needs, curriculum and instructional methods, program structures and management systems, professional roles and responsibilities, community involvement, procedures for members to enter and exit the program and on-going program evaluation.
- Teams must establish reasonable timelines to guide their implementation efforts.
- Good program descriptors make sense, appear logical and feasible, incorporate sound educational practices and are attentive to legal and ethical issues.
- Unfortunately there are no short cuts.
- Many people feel less threatened by a pilot or field test because the very terminology conveys that the initiative is still in its formative stage.
- For a pilot test to work you must: 1st ensure that all necessary supports are provided so that the experimental effort is highly effective, 2nd the initiative must be highly visible, and 3rd the pilot test must include a solid evaluation plan.
- Well designed plans provide a framework for action.

5. Adequate Resources

- Without adequate resources implementation processes will be ineffective.
- Because making changes is a disruptive process, administrators must provide all participants with opportunities to hone their communication and problem-solving skills.

6. Sustained Implementation Support

- Significant change can take years to accomplish. Large scale, system-wide changes may require several years before the innovations are fully embraced as fundamental components of the system.
- Setbacks or implementation dips inevitably occur as organizations move beyond familiar methods to newer, more effective approaches.
- A comprehensive approach to professional development is perhaps the most critical dimension of sustained support for successful program implementation.

- In the early stages of change, individuals are most concerned about the personal ramifications of how it will affect them and their individual groups. In the most advanced stages, members think of ways to make it even more effective.

7. Continuous Evaluation and Improvement

- A hallmark of excellent organizations is that they can communicate to multiple audiences what results they are aiming for, how they will accomplish the goals and objectives and by what timelines.
- The final component essential to effective inclusion education is systematic, ongoing evaluation and improvement.
- Evaluation questions may address the design of the inclusion and collaboration model, its implementation, or its impact on existing programs, adult participants, and the system as a whole.
- You cannot describe the program strong points without having evaluated the design of the model.
- The process of continuous evaluation helps to ensure that all committees are results-oriented and not merely innovative.
- The use of multiple measures strengthens the conclusions that can be drawn from the evaluation process.

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